

# CURRENT HISTORY

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## AFRICA, 1992

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# CURRENT HISTORY

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## EDITOR'S NOTE:

Democratic change in sub-Saharan Africa continues, as long-time single-party states give way to multiparty politics. Zambia, which Richard Joseph examines in this issue, is one of the most hopeful examples of this change. But government promises of multiparty democracy without significant movement toward concrete implementation are also rife on the continent; one of the most blatant examples is Kenya under Daniel arap Moi, which is discussed by Jennifer Widner.

In a continent that is already woefully underreported, Sahelian Africa stands out as barely meriting attention in the American press. Richard Sklar reviews the conflicts that mar political progress in the region, and assesses whether democratic rule is possible in view of the endemic violence there. Violence also promises to obstruct the negotiations for a nonracial government in South Africa. The prospects for change are analyzed by former political prisoner Khehla Shubane, who is on balance pessimistic.

Michael Clough offers a critical review of American strategic disengagement from Africa since the end of the cold war. He finds that while the Bush administration has promoted democracy rhetorically, it has withdrawn financially and morally, leaving the continent that served as a proxy battleground during the cold war saddled with problems that the United States is in the best position to help resolve.

Along with drought and underdevelopment, nothing will have a greater impact on Africa's future demographic makeup than AIDS. Dennis Weeks offers a detailed overview of its genesis and spread across the continent.

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With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, "the United States [has become] the only super-power in the world. This has caused Africa . . . to look to Washington for direction, encouragement, and support. . . . Unfortunately, there is no evidence that President Bush or any of his senior advisers intend to take up the mantle of leadership in Africa."

## The United States and Africa: The Policy of Cynical Disengagement

BY MICHAEL CLOUGH

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Washington first discovered Africa in the late 1950s. For the next three decades, American policymakers navigated the continent's political seas with their sextants trained on the changing position of a single bright Red Star. Whenever it appeared on the horizon, Yankee captains quickly set sail for Africa's troubled ports, bringing with them an ample cargo of diplomatic rewards, economic aid, and, if necessary, military largesse. Every time the Soviet star began to set, Uncle Sam's minions loaded up their ships and sailed for home.

In the late 1980s the Red Star began to implode, and the charts used by the geopoliticians who had guided America through the cold war quickly lost their relevance. A new set of navigators schooled in the epicycles of American domestic politics stepped forward to direct the fleet. Now, it is drifting aimlessly off the African coast with its Republican admirals in Washington unwilling either to order it to hoist anchor and set sail for home, or to brave Africa's troubled shoals and go ashore.

### THE POLITICS OF AVOIDANCE

Since the administration of President George Bush took office in January 1989, its policy toward Africa has

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<sup>1</sup>Allison Rosenberg, "FY 1990 Assistance Request for Sub-Saharan Africa," *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 89, no. 2146 (July 1989), p. 41.

seemingly operated according to three guidelines: "Do not spend much money unless Congress makes you." "Do not let African issues complicate policy toward other, more important parts of the world." And, above all else, "Do not take stands that might create political controversies in the United States." In practice this has meant the adoption of a wavering, hypocritical policy best described as "cynical disengagement."

While the president continues to speak in overblown rhetorical terms about the need for American global leadership in a "new world order," he has refused to exercise any leadership on African issues. Instead, his administration has found convenient rationales for reducing United States commitments across the continent and shifting the burden of responding to its multiplying humanitarian crises to others. Nowhere is the nature of the administration's policy more glaringly obvious than in its abrupt shift on human rights in Africa.

Throughout the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan lavished millions of dollars in economic and military assistance on some of Africa's worst human rights violators. At the top of this list were Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe in Liberia, President Mohammed Siad Barre in Somalia, and President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. Despite continual calls in the United States Congress to cut off funds to these despots, Washington kept the aid pipeline open. In April 1989, for example, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Allison Rosenberg testified against congressional cuts in assistance to Kenya, Somalia, and Zaire, warning that "should we be unable to sustain necessary assistance levels, we risk the collapse or delay of economic reforms, injury to friendly governments, and acrimonious charges of breach of faith."<sup>1</sup>

The administration's policy did not significantly



change until 1991 when, as it became clear that all the old geopolitical reasons for United States involvement in Africa had vanished, the administration chose to cut and run just as the collapse of its former clients touched off a bitter cycle of violence. Blithely ignoring the ways in which their past policies had helped cause these countries to descend into a dark abyss of repression and strife, American officials cynically used human rights and security concerns to justify their decisions to disengage. Liberia, Somalia, and Zaire provide the most egregious examples of cynical disengagement, but the underlying pattern can be discerned in the way that Washington has responded to developments across Africa.

## THE POLICY IN ACTION

Between 1980 and 1988, the United States gave more than \$500 million in assistance to the Doe regime in Liberia. Throughout this period the Reagan administration consistently misled the American public about the prospects for economic development and democracy in this small West African country. Testifying before Congress in April 1983, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker strained the bounds of credulity by arguing that Liberia represented "the best prospect in Africa, and one of the best in the world, for rapid movement toward democracy." Even after Doe blatantly rigged the results of nationwide elections in late 1985, the Reagan-Bush team resisted congressional efforts to cut off aid to his regime. Not until 1988, after a special United States Agency for International Development (AID) team failed to control the Doe regime's financial excesses and Congress barred further aid, did the administration finally begin to distance itself from Doe. By then it was too late.

In December 1989 rebels led by a former Liberian military officer, Charles Taylor, began a guerrilla war against the Doe regime. As the war escalated, many Liberians pleaded with the Bush administration to do something to help remove Doe from office and spare their country from a bloody conflict. But by 1990 senior officials in Washington had forgotten their earlier reasons for being interested in Liberia. A State Department spokesman declared that "the administration believes that it is not our role to intervene, to engage in peacekeeping or to impose a government or political system in Liberia."<sup>2</sup> In late 1990, with thousands of Liberian civilians dying in the crossfire of the civil war, Bush

authorized United States marines to land in Liberia, but only to evacuate American citizens and other expatriates. When pressed to defend past United States policy, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen argued that the United States was blameless. Despite Washington's best efforts, Cohen rationalized, "Doe was just not able to come around to do the correct thing."

As the civil war continued and Liberia descended into anarchy, the Bush administration offered palliatives. Midlevel officials in the State Department worked long hours trying to obtain funds for a Nigerian-led peacekeeping force and to aid efforts to hold nationwide elections. But their superiors steadfastly refused to provide what was needed most: political leadership and diplomatic capital.

In Somalia, the Bush administration also cynically disengaged. During the 1980s, President Siad Barre's regime received more than \$700 million in economic and military assistance from the Reagan and Bush administrations. By 1989 most analysts had concluded that the Siad Barre regime was a brutal, corrupt dictatorship on the verge of collapse. Nevertheless, officials in the Bush administration continued to resist congressional efforts to cut off aid to Mogadishu. In February 1990, for example, a then little-known general, H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who headed the United States Central Command, testified before Congress that continued military relations with Somalia "allows us to maintain valuable contacts, counterbalances the growing relationship between Somalia and Libya, and helps Somalia to maintain its political and territorial integrity."<sup>3</sup>

In January 1991, Somalia disintegrated and Siad Barre fled the capital. As the fighting escalated, the Bush administration once again cut and ran. In April, Senators Paul Simon (D-Ill.) and Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.) introduced a resolution calling on the president to "actively explore possible United States initiatives to reconcile the conflicting factions and...encourage...efforts by outside mediators." But the president ignored the senators' plea. Senior administration officials also rejected recommendations to put Somalia on the United Nations Security Council agenda. When the Security Council finally addressed the conflict in Somalia in 1992, United States representatives reportedly watered down the resolution calling for UN involvement out of fear that Washington might have to help foot the bill for a peacekeeping operation. Africa Watch, a widely respected human rights organization, was quick to point out the hypocrisy of Washington's position. In a February 1992 report, it noted, "The United States managed to find hundreds of millions of dollars for the Siad Barre regime," which, the report's authors justifiably concluded, "helped to lay the groundwork for the country's destruction today."<sup>4</sup>

Zaire may soon become the next country to follow the pattern established in Liberia and Somalia. Wash-

<sup>2</sup>"U.S. Explains Reluctance to Intervene," *The Washington Post*, July 31, 1990, p. A18.

<sup>3</sup>United States Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1991*, 101st Congress, 2d session, February 8, 1990, p. 151.

<sup>4</sup>Africa Watch, "Somalia: A Fight to the Death," *News From Africa Watch*, vol. 4, no. 2 (February 13, 1992), p. 26.

ington has a long and blameworthy history of support for the Mobutu regime in Zaire. From 1961 to 1990, Mobutu consistently ranked among the top recipients of American aid. In addition, on three separate occasions the United States intervened to help the Zairian dictator quell armed rebellions that threatened his hold on power.\* Just as important, United States officials repeatedly endorsed him in ways that strengthened his domestic and international standing. In October 1989, for example, Bush called Mobutu "one of our most valued friends [on] the entire African continent."

In 1991, United States policy toward Zaire began to change. In the past, Washington had backed Mobutu largely because it feared that if he fell, Zaire would be plunged into chaos and Moscow would benefit. The end of the cold war eliminated this worry. In addition, the May 1991 agreement ending the Angolan civil war greatly reduced Mobutu's regional utility. (It was a poorly kept secret that the Central Intelligence Agency used airfields in southern Zaire to channel covert aid to Jonas Savimbi's anti-Communist guerrillas in Angola.) As a result, senior United States officials had no reason to continue to support the Zairian dictator.

The Bush administration now has two options. It can distance itself from developments in Kinshasa, leaving Mobutu and his domestic opponents to wage a protracted battle for power. That is the strategy it pursued in Liberia and Somalia. Alternatively, it could lead a coordinated international effort to force Mobutu to step down. So far, consistent with its practice of cynical disengagement, the administration has chosen the first option. While criticizing Mobutu for failing to cede power to a national conference and to permit multiparty elections, Bush has refused to expend any political capital to help remove him from office before Zaire disintegrates. In an interview with *The Washington Post*, William Close, who served as Mobutu's personal physician for 16 years, attested to the critical importance of presidential leadership on this issue. "Until Mobutu hears a clear, unequivocal message from the highest level in Washington, he is going to cling to the belief that he can stay put, and the brutality and repression and human misery will spread."<sup>5</sup>

Another country that could follow the Liberia/Somalia pattern is Kenya. Since coming to power in 1978, President Daniel arap Moi has received more than \$700 million in United States aid. During that time his government has become steadily more corrupt and repressive. In early 1990 the Bush administration had an opportunity to seize the initiative and support the bur-

geoning democratic movement in Kenya. This opportunity was created by the firestorm that ignited after the United States ambassador to Kenya—a crusty and distinctly undiplomatic conservative ex-journalist, Smith Hempstone—endorsed the opposition's call for multiparty democracy. President Moi and his supporters immediately launched a rhetorical assault on Hempstone. In August 1990, Assistant Secretary Cohen traveled to Nairobi to calm the political waters. During his brief stay, Cohen refused to meet with human rights monitors or the relatives of political detainees, and he declined to criticize the Moi regime publicly. As Africa Watch later reported, "Cohen's visit strengthened President Moi's hand at a time of mounting pressure for Kenya to democratize, sending a clear message that the United States was not going to press human rights concerns. This stance...helped to facilitate the serious deterioration of respect for human rights that followed."<sup>6</sup>

Inside Kenya, however, pressure on the Moi government continued to build. In late November 1991, on the eve of a meeting of Kenya's major international donors, Paul Muite, a prominent opposition leader, pressed for a suspension of aid to Moi. He warned that any new money would be "mismanaged and stolen" by an "incompetent and corrupt regime." Finally, the United States and other foreign donors suspended all new aid pledges for six months. In response, Moi reversed his long-standing opposition to multiparty elections.

The Moi government now seems intent on holding elections quickly in order to prevent the democratic opposition from organizing an effective national party. In addition, there is mounting evidence that Moi's backers intend to use all the power at their disposal to obstruct and intimidate their opponents. In response to this deteriorating situation, the Bush administration has become increasingly critical of Moi. But as in Zaire, the important issue is whether Washington is willing to take decisive action to forestall a violent denouement.

## FADING AMERICAN LEADERSHIP

In all four of these countries, the prospects for the emergence of stable democratic governments would have been much better if the Bush administration had moved earlier to take advantage of the latitude created by the end of the cold war. But old habits are hard to break. President Bush and his team are most comfortable working with foreign governments using traditional diplomatic methods. They instinctively prefer "quiet diplomacy," especially when the rulers they are dealing with are "old friends." Moreover, in the absence of a strong American constituency for serious efforts to promote democracy in Africa, Washington has few incentives to take on hard cases like Liberia, Somalia, and Zaire.

In September 1991, Assistant Secretary Cohen outlined the administration's policy toward Africa: "We will help countries pursue a democratic course and those

\*The interventions were in 1967, 1977, and 1978.

<sup>5</sup>Reed Kramer, "U.S. Reviews Its Policy on Zaire," *The Washington Post*, January 27, 1992, p. A1.

<sup>6</sup>Human Rights Watch, *World Report 1990* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), p. 42.

already with democratic systems. In an era of escalating demand for scarce resources, we cannot waste nonhumanitarian assistance on governments which themselves refuse the path to democracy, and we will not do so."<sup>7</sup> In practice, this means giving priority to easier and less risky cases. This position fits perfectly with the prevailing political mood in America. It aligns the administration with an appealing cause—democracy—while promising to help end the waste of United States aid dollars. If such a policy had been adopted in the 1980s it would have been rightly hailed as a revolutionary step forward. More important, it would have weakened several pro-Western autocrats, and thus greatly increased the chances for peaceful transitions to democracy across the continent. In the present context it is little more than a convenient way to reduce United States commitments.

The Bush administration's policy on democracy and human rights reflects a more general problem in United States relations with Africa. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has created a unipolar world by default. Despite its own growing economic and political limitations, the United States is the only superpower in the world. This has caused Africa, perhaps more than any other part of the world, to look to Washington for direction, encouragement, and support. In fact, Africans are now more willing to follow an American lead than at any time since the early days of the Kennedy era. Their expectations have been raised by American officials, especially Assistant Secretary Cohen. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that President Bush or any of his senior advisers intend to take up the mantle of leadership in Africa. Three examples illustrate this point.

Over the past three years United States development aid to Africa has increased from roughly \$600 million to \$1 billion. This money has been used to underwrite a Development Fund for Africa and AID's so-called Democracy Initiative. On the surface, this increase would seem to indicate a serious administration commitment to African development. But that is not the case. If the Bush administration had gotten its way, aid to Africa would have been cut to \$560 million in 1990. Congress stepped in and raised the figure to \$800 million. It did so because of complaints from the Congressional Black Caucus that money for Africa was being diverted to eastern Europe. Congress was also responsible for increasing the 1991 and 1992 African aid levels to \$1 billion. If congressional support for spending on Africa lessens, so too will the administration's interest in providing funds to promote democracy and development.

Recent developments in United States relations with Ethiopia provide a second example of the cynical underpinnings of current United States policy toward Africa.

In late 1984 televised pictures of starving Ethiopian babies spawned strong American sentiment for emergency famine relief. After being largely ignored by senior officials for nearly two years, the Ethiopian famine rocketed to the top of the Reagan administration's foreign policy agenda. During congressional hearings on emergency food assistance to Africa in September 1984, the top United States AID officer barely mentioned Ethiopia, noting in passing that "it wasn't altogether popular in this Government to get food to Ethiopia." After the public outcry less than two months later, the White House issued a statement noting that the president "has taken a personal interest in the famine situation in Africa, particularly the current crisis in Ethiopia," and shortly thereafter United States relief aid to Ethiopia increased from \$10 million in 1984 to more than \$125 million in 1985, most of which was committed after television publicity of the famine.

By the time the Bush administration took office, a vast relief network existed in Ethiopia. As it became clear that the famine would continue so long as Ethiopia was engulfed in a civil war, relief organizations and members of Congress concerned about the humanitarian consequences of the war began to press for American efforts to promote a settlement between the government in Addis Ababa and rebel forces. Relief proponents were joined by a small but influential group of American Jewish leaders who were concerned about the plight of several thousand Ethiopian Jews.

After a series of stillborn initiatives, the government and the rebels agreed to attend a conference in London chaired by Assistant Secretary Cohen. On the eve of the conference, Ethiopia's military ruler, Mengistu Haile Mariam, fled Addis Ababa and rebel forces quickly surrounded the capital. From London, Cohen signaled the leaders of the main rebel force—the Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Democratic Front—that they should move into the capital and establish order. In fact, Cohen was in no position to stop the EPRDF from moving into the city. (Days earlier the EPRDF had ignored his request that they halt their march on the capital.) But Cohen's actions created two false impressions. First, they suggested that Washington was in a position to call the shots in Ethiopia. Equally important, they caused Ethiopians to believe that the Bush administration was greatly interested in their country.

If it had not been for the pressure from American Jews concerned about the Ethiopian Jews, Cohen and National Security Council staff assistant Robert Frasure would not have been able to persuade the White House to allow them to become deeply involved in the negotiations in the first place. Moreover, the Cohen team's ability to stay involved always depended on a smooth progression of events in Ethiopia. If serious fighting had broken out in Addis Ababa, most informed analysts agree that Secretary of State James Baker 3d would have ordered his deputy to pull back.

AID and other agencies are now busily attempting to

<sup>7</sup>Herman Cohen, "Africa: Revolutionary Change and Democratization," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, November–December 1991, p. 24.



help the EPRDF carry out elections and prepare for a referendum that will allow for the independence of the province of Eritrea. Their efforts are critically needed. But the ability of midlevel American officials to remain involved in this deeply divided country depends on a perception that the transition to democracy is proceeding smoothly. If the process begins to break down, the upper echelons of the Bush administration are still likely to withdraw quickly.

## **DISENGAGING FROM SOUTH AFRICA**

South Africa provides a final example of the Bush administration's cynical attitude toward the continent. As vice president, George Bush was a strong proponent of the strategy of so-called "constructive engagement."<sup>8</sup> In fact, the architect of that strategy—Chester Crocker—was originally an adviser to Bush, not Reagan. But once he became president, Bush and his secretary of state immediately distanced themselves from the politically discredited South Africa policy of their Republican predecessors—and conveniently failed to find a new job in their administration for Crocker.

The predispositions of Bush administration officials toward South Africa differ only slightly from those of the Reagan administration. They are still more preoccupied with white politics than black politics. They continue to believe that the best way to promote political reform is to encourage and reward the South African National party leadership. And, like officials in the Reagan administration, they prefer to work with black "moderates" such as Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi rather than the more militant but vastly more popular leaders of the African National Congress (ANC). In contrast to President Reagan and Assistant Secretary Crocker, however, President Bush and Secretary Baker are much less interested in South Africa and much more attuned to domestic politics.

The major objective of the Bush administration's policy toward South Africa is to avoid domestic political controversy. This is clear from the way in which the administration has handled the question of lifting congressionally imposed sanctions against Pretoria. Bush and his foreign policy advisers never favored sanctions. Once in office, they were quick to bow to Congress by acknowledging that sanctions had had a positive effect. During his first two and a half years in office, the president consistently rejected midlevel staff recommendations to ease sanctions. Then, in July 1991 he issued a finding that South Africa had met the conditions for lifting sanctions contained in the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. With the release from jail of ANC leader Nelson Mandela and other political

prisoners, the unbanning of the ANC, and the repeal of most apartheid legislation, the situation in South Africa had changed dramatically. But the timing of the White House decision was based mainly on an assessment of political conditions in the United States, rather than irreversible progress in South Africa. The president lifted sanctions when he did because he and Baker were finally confident that they could do so without provoking a fight with Congress.

The congressionally mandated decision to allocate special funds for political organizing to the ANC and Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom party (IFP) provides another example of the way domestic politics shapes American involvement in South Africa. After a long and bitter partisan battle, \$4.8 million was set aside for the ANC and \$2.7 million for the IFP. These figures had little to do with either assessed needs in South Africa or the relative political support of these two parties. They were instead a reflection of the relative political support for Mandela and Buthelezi in the United States Congress. Domestic politics—sensitivity to domestic predilections—also accounts for the fact that the Bush administration's fiscal year 1992 and 1993 budgets contain more aid for South Africa, the continent's richest country, than for any other African country.

## **RHETORIC AND REALITY**

In September 1991, Assistant Secretary Cohen hailed the "profound, revolutionary" changes "sweeping through the continent," and urged Africans to take charge of their own agenda. "When the voices of the new Africa speak," he declared, "we will reply: 'We are listening. The United States stands ready to assist. We have reservoirs of talent, experience, and financial resources that can have a real and lasting impact. We can and will remain engaged in Africa's progress toward democracy—and we will not abandon Africa when democracy is achieved.'"<sup>9</sup> Given the Bush administration's record in Africa, it is impossible not to view Cohen's speech as either naïve or disingenuous. Officials in the Africa Bureau of the State Department, AID, the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance, and the United States mission to the UN have dedicated long hours to finding ways to address Africa's crises and formulating strategies to promote democracy and development. But their efforts will not have a "real and lasting" effect until they are backed by solid support from their superiors.

Misleading Africans about the depth of American commitment to help them in their struggles is a mistake. In any case the United States is not likely to provide a substantial share of the aid and capital that Africa needs to democratize and prosper. (In 1990, United States aid to sub-Saharan Africa constituted only about 6 percent of total aid to the continent.) Moreover, unlike during the cold war years, United States aid to the continent is now widely dispersed. (In fiscal year 1993, 23 countries will receive between \$10 million and \$40 million; only South Africa will receive more.) As a result, that aid is less

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<sup>8</sup>For background on the policy of constructive engagement, see Michael Clough, "Southern Africa: Challenges and Choices," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 66, no. 5 (Summer 1988).

<sup>9</sup>Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

**United States Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa for Fiscal Year 1991**

(in thousands of United States dollars)

Country	Total Aid	Country	Total Aid	Country	Total Aid
Angola	7,460	Ghana	36,144	Rwanda	38,180
Benin	22,549	Guinea	35,813	São Tomé and Príncipe	818
Botswana	7,659	Guinea-Bissau	3,199	Senegal	25,170
Burkina Faso	11,965	Ivory Coast	23,520	Seychelles	3,300
Burundi	12,465	Kenya	30,114	Sierra Leone	6,261
Cameroon	18,443	Lesotho	11,614	Somalia	3,071
Cape Verde	3,852	Liberia	43,500	South Africa	48,400
Central African Republic	456	Madagascar	16,982	Sudan	39,203
Chad	17,027	Malawi	59,144	Swaziland	8,850
Comoros	700	Mali	37,235	Tanzania	34,835
Congo	2,748	Mauritania	3,291	Togo	10,665
Djibouti	4,018	Mauritius	3,033	Uganda	50,003
Equatorial Guinea	850	Mozambique	75,398	Zaire	33,477
Ethiopia	49,016	Namibia	17,000	Zambia	22,001
Gabon	not reported	Niger	22,919	Zimbabwe	10,536
Gambia	14,720	Nigeria	5,400	Regional and special programs	195,207
				<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,128,211</b>

Source: United States Department of State, Office of Development Planning (Washington, D.C.). Figures reflect actual aid disbursed.

likely to have a significant effect in individual countries.

The United States has a long history of raising African expectations only to dash them. Some Zimbabweans still wonder what happened to a pledge that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger seemed to have made in 1976 to provide \$1 billion to assist in the transition from white minority rule. Liberians, many of them educated at American universities, are only now beginning to recover from the shock of realizing that they were the only ones who took seriously the idea of a "special relationship" between their country and the United States. In the long run, nothing will damage United States standing in Africa more than misleading Africans about American willingness to support them in their struggles.

If the Bush administration (or its successor) is sincerely interested in helping Africa come to terms with the end of the cold war, there are two things that it needs to do. First, it must take the lead in the UN to help Africa

develop a new regional order and create strong regional institutions that can prevent or resolve the kinds of conflicts that are now tearing apart so many of the continent's countries. Second, it must find ways to strengthen the ties between American civil society and African civil society. Fostering exchanges between the human rights organizations, environmental groups, and professional associations that make up civil society would do far more to help the continent than increasing the aid budget, since these create lasting personal and institutional linkages.

The main obstacle to a change of policy is the Bush administration's belief that it can have it both ways in the post-cold war era. It wants the United States to remain the preeminent global leader, but does not want to pay the price of exercising that leadership, at least not in Africa. Sooner or later it will have to choose. It will have to either call the fleet home or send it ashore. ■



Zambia's multiparty elections in late 1991 saw the end of single-party rule and the emergence of a freely elected government. Richard Joseph, who took part in monitoring the elections, examines the new government and finds that "Zambia stands a good chance of becoming a beacon of political liberty" in Africa.

## Zambia: A Model for Democratic Change

BY RICHARD JOSEPH

Certain dates stand out in the democratic upheaval that has swept the African continent since 1989.\* Among them is October 31, 1991, when Kenneth Kaunda's 27-year rule over the Republic of Zambia was brought to an end by a free and fair vote by the Zambian people. Zambians chose trade union leader Frederick Chiluba to replace Kaunda as president, while giving the insurgents' party, the Movement for a Multiparty Democracy (MMD), 125 of the 150 seats in the country's unicameral parliament.

Zambia thus joined Benin and the island nations of Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe in ousting an incumbent government through elections in the current wave of political renewal in Africa. Only the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius had experienced such a reversal in the three decades of postcolonial government in Africa. And of these events, the defeat of Kaunda and his ruling United National Independence party (UNIP) was surely the most momentous.

Kaunda belonged to the pantheon of African leaders—including Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta, Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, and Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah—who had wrested independence from the colonial authorities. Over the course of his almost 30 years in power, he had twice served as chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and was a respected leader of the black-ruled "frontline" states in their confrontations with South Africa. Kaunda had become a

symbol of African determination to resist racist regimes, whether the Rhodesia of Prime Minister Ian Smith or the South Africa of Presidents H. F. Verwoerd and P. W. Botha.

### THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SINGLE-PARTY STATE

The relentless decline of the Zambian economy in the 1980s and the collapse of world prices for Zambia's primary export, copper, resulted in the emergence of opposition to Zambia's single-party state. Although Zambia was one of the wealthiest African nations at independence, stagnant agricultural growth and government mismanagement of the country's vast copper deposits led to a sustained deterioration in the standard of living. By 1990 basic social services had crumbled, schools lacked books, and hospitals were spurned by all but the indigent. Food riots erupted in the capital, Lusaka, in June 1990 after a government effort to decontrol the price of maize meal, the country's staple food, brought large price increases.

On June 30 an army officer burst into a radio station and announced that the Kaunda government had been overthrown. Thousands of Zambians poured into the streets to celebrate. Although the coup attempt quickly fizzled, it sent an unmistakable signal: the people were tired of the government, and they wanted change.

The MMD's broad-based coalition of trade unions, businesses, and civic groups, established in July 1990, pressed for a referendum on a future government for Zambia. Increasing support for the MMD forced the initially unyielding Kaunda to relent, and a date was set for the vote. Challenged by enormous opposition rallies, however, the president canceled the referendum and amended the constitution to permit the legal registration of other parties. The MMD—whose slogan "The hour has come!" came to represent popular demands for a return to accountable government—officially registered as a political party shortly after the amendment was approved by parliament in December 1990. Continued controversy culminated in a meeting between Kaunda and Chiluba in July 1991, at which Kaunda agreed to take account of some opposition demands in a new constitution.

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\*For a general overview of democratization in Africa, see Richard Joseph, "Africa: The Rebirth of Political Freedom," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 2, no. 4 (Fall 1991); additional information on Zambia can be found in Michael Bratton, "The Rebirth of Political Pluralism in Zambia," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 3, no. 2 (Spring 1992).

The opposition also insisted on the need for international observers to monitor forthcoming multiparty elections, since the government's overwhelming control of material resources, including the electronic and print media, provoked fears that the elections would not be fair. Although he initially disparaged the notion of observers, Kaunda was once again made to reverse himself—and not only because of popular pressure.

The country was by now in receivership to a host of international and bilateral lending agencies. Successive International Monetary Fund stabilization plans had been agreed to but not implemented. Zambia was in arrears on its repayment schedules and spending millions of dollars monthly to subsidize maize sales while failing to pay agricultural producers an attractive price. It was an extreme case of an economy in need of adjustment. The government's ability to resist the growing political opposition was sapped by the increasing reluctance of foreign creditors to keep bailing it out.

It is to the advantage of Zambians that Kaunda has never been averse to changing his position when confronted by overwhelming force of numbers or argument. Although autocratic, he never became a brutal dictator like President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. Kaunda yielded on the issue of election observers, and issued invitations to several world leaders and international organizations. Leading an array of groups that took on the task was a joint operation of the Carter Center at Emory University and the National Democratic Institute of International Affairs. Two Zambian umbrella groups were also formed: the Zambia Independent Monitoring Team and the Zambia Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC). Together with delegations from the British Commonwealth and the OAU, they provided effective surveillance of the balloting and vote-counting on October 31 and November 1. In acknowledgment of the MMD's landslide victory, Chiluba was inaugurated as the first president of the Third Republic on November 2, even though no official tally had been announced.

Although several other opposition parties emerged as soon as multiparty politics was legalized, the MMD was able to retain the bulk of its organizers and supporters when it transformed itself from a movement to a party of the same name. To the surprise of many observers, Chiluba, for 17 years the leader of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, defeated several seasoned politicians to become the MMD's leader and later the party's presidential candidate. Chiluba's ascent was aided by the visibility he had gained from opposing the Kaunda regime over the years. In 1980, Chiluba's expulsion from UNIP resulted in wildcat strikes in the Copperbelt, which were joined by bank workers. In 1981, Chiluba and four colleagues were detained by the government before being released on an order from the High Court. Over the course of his political career, Chiluba has gradually converted from socialism to capitalism.

## PROMISED TRANSFORMATIONS

After decades of state-directed experimentation in Zambia that left the country saddled with inefficient state-owned

corporations in almost every sector of the economy, the MMD was determined to embark on a thoroughgoing program of privatization. It was also determined to wean Zambians from the subsidization of basic consumer items, especially maize meal, which the country could no longer afford.

The new government's program of reforms was intended to be comprehensive. There was, first of all, the issue of corruption. The extensive public sector in Zambia, the sprawling structures from years of single-party rule, and the pocketing of much of the country's foreign exchange earnings from the sale of copper had created fertile conditions for the growth of corrupt practices. One of the Chiluba government's first acts was to order the sealing of the offices of Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines, the country's huge corporation for copper sales, to prevent the destruction of evidence needed for an investigation of the corrupt use of the company's proceeds over many years.

The freedoms to assemble, to organize, and to express grievances, which had been reasserted during the campaign for multiparty democracy, were also given new force. Civic groups that took part in election monitoring, especially under the umbrella of the ZEMCC, are determined to continue working to further civic education, political liberties, and human rights. They should help broaden the process of democratization beyond the deliberations in parliament and the jousting of political parties.

The most promising sign for the future is that the new government is resolved to implement its challenging economic program. Sharp increases in producer prices for maize have been introduced, and government subsidies have been reduced, without propelling Zambians into the streets to protest, as would certainly have been the case under the previous government. Unfortunately, one of the most severe droughts in recent memory struck the region while the new policies were being put into effect, forcing the government to seek emergency assistance. Nevertheless, bureaucratic barriers to private investment are being stripped away, and the government is quickly preparing a recovery program that will set guidelines for domestic and foreign investors.

Some old habits that appear to infringe human rights and to belie Zambia's commitment to the highest international standards have resurfaced in certain ministries. Questionable actions under ministerial sponsorship have included a roundup of hundreds of aliens, many from West Africa, who have been accused of taking part in illegal mining and the smuggling of gemstones. In some cases the police have entered mosques to seize their quarry. But Zambia's minister of legal affairs, Rodger Chongwe, is a strong advocate of human rights who has not hesitated to bring to the attention of errant fellow ministers the standards of civil liberties and human rights that the government has pledged to uphold. Combined with the significant degree of judicial independence that was the norm under Kaunda, Zambia stands a good chance of becoming a beacon of political liberty on the continent.

In the rush to eliminate public ownership and govern-

ment control of industry and commerce, however, the redressing of social inequities in Zambia appears to have been postponed. It will be interesting to see how long the government can continue on such a course before the pain of economic adjustment and the generally meager living standards for most of the population prompt calls for more immediate relief.

## LESSONS FROM ZAMBIA

The message of the Zambian transition that has come through most loudly and clearly is that Africa is ready for multiparty democracy. To cite just one indication of the Zambian model's influence, examine the case of Cameroon, where the opposition has been locked in a struggle with the government of President Paul Biya over demands for an open political system. In the January–March 1992 issue of *Cameroon Monitor*, it is argued that

despite the scaremongering which predicted chaos and general instability in Zambia were free elections to be held there, now that these are a fait accompli, Kenneth Kaunda has had the decency to bow to popular will and has made his exit from the political arena in a quiet and dignified way. The Zambian case has illustrated that a peaceful transfer of power from an unpopular government to a free and universally elected one is possible.

All the usual arguments that leaders such as Daniel arap Moi of Kenya were making to justify denying people the right to decide who should govern them lost much of their force as Zambia democratized without any loss of life. Those acts of violence that occurred were confined to particular areas and did not affect the generally peaceful conduct of the electoral campaign, the voting, or the ballot-counting.

Zambia has also sent a message to those countries that have embarked on more convoluted transition processes, especially through the agency of a national conference that brings together various social forces to establish a transitional government to prepare for national elections. This Jacobin model of civil revolution seemed at first to be an effective means for uprooting entrenched autocracies. But as more of these transitions have been derailed or halted by embattled regimes, for example in Togo and Zaire—or become trapped in prolonged struggles for such a conference, as in Cameroon and Burkina Faso—the Zambian route of a modified revision of the constitution immediately followed by free and fair elections seems to hold clear advantages.

The key element is free elections. Most authoritarian African governments will not permit them. Thus the opposition is usually forced to boycott those elections that are held, as in Burkina Faso, or to take part only under protest, as in Ivory Coast, thereby yielding governments that lack legitimacy. Dissatisfaction among forces that feel cheated of the opportunity to effect genuine political renewal could lead to continued instability in such countries.

The international community is deeply involved in these processes and will remain so for many years. Cold war politics has left deep marks on the political psyche of African countries accustomed to being kept afloat by their patrons in the Western or Eastern bloc. Most countries in Africa are in economic distress and survive only through an array of development loans and grants from more affluent countries and international organizations.

In 1989 and 1990 several Western governments sent unmistakable warnings to Africa's rulers that they could no longer rely on external financial and military support in facing popular unrest, which was likely to continue. This tilt in favor of the burgeoning opposition has played a major role in hastening the transformations in Africa that have already occurred. However, the attention spans of Western governments may not be long. France, for example, has already shown a lack of resolution when longtime clients such as President Gnassingbé Eyadéma in Togo and Biya in Cameroon opted to use force against opponents. As this pattern of behavior is replicated elsewhere—for example in Burkina Faso—opposition forces are likely to move to direct confrontations, knowing that they cannot depend on France to pressure the regime to make it more responsive. In the case of the other major former colonial power in Africa, Great Britain, lofty ideals frequently expressed in London by ministers in support of democratization are seldom reflected in concrete action in Africa, even in countries such as Kenya, with which Britain enjoys strong economic ties.

Fortunately, other countries have become more resolute in supporting democratic transitions in Africa, notably the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and, increasingly, Germany. As for the United States, for the first time in the postcolonial history of Africa it is implementing policies toward Africa that reflect the principles for which the American government stands. Whatever the outcome of the 1992 presidential election in the United States, it does not appear that this refreshing change in official behavior is at risk.

The democratic movement in Africa, however, cannot count too much on foreign goodwill. The future, Chiluba has emphasized to the Zambian people, is up to them. As he declared in his inaugural address, "In our time of need, we will look to the world not for handouts, but for help to stand on our own feet again." The new president has repeatedly admonished Zambians to reestablish traditions of hard work and honesty that were eroded during the years of single-party dominance.

If Zambia succeeds, many other countries in Africa can be induced to follow its lead; if it falters, the remaining autocrats will feel that they can ease a few controls on their societies and win sufficient respite from external pressures for change. The Zambian government and people are fully aware of the national, continental, and international implications signaled by October's new beginning. Zambia's courageous battle to add economic recovery to political renewal should command as much attention as the precarious experiments now under way in eastern Europe. ■



"The [governing] National party seems as concerned with preserving its own power in the current negotiations [on a nonracial democracy] as it is with the negotiations themselves. Many radical black opponents of the government believe that the regime is negotiating not to give up power completely and allow the establishment of an unfettered democracy.... The National party, they believe, will use its powerful position to structure the transition to ensure it a place in future postapartheid governments."

## South Africa: A New Government in the Making?

BY KHEHLA SHUBANE

The last two years have seen exciting and potentially far-reaching changes unfold at breakneck speed in South Africa. Political organizations have been unbanned, political prisoners released—including African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela—and negotiations begun for a new constitution. For South Africa, the only country in the world with legally institutionalized racial discrimination, these achievements are indeed noteworthy. The speed of these events, however, does not mean that the process of democratization has taken root.

Political change remains stuck at the liberalization stage, and it is uncertain how, or even whether, it will proceed to full democratization. The National party government's unbanning of political groups has made it easier for blacks to participate in politics, as has the repeal of many apartheid laws. But these steps have not led to the enfranchisement of South Africa's blacks, who constitute almost 70 percent of the population and yet are governed by a white minority Parliament that excludes them. The lack of progress toward democratization has led many black opposition groups, principally the African National Congress (ANC), to persist in calling for measures such as international economic sanctions to remain in place.

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1H. Giliomee, "The Last Trek? Afrikaners in Transition to Democracy," *South Africa International*, vol. 22, no. 3 (January 1992).

### THE GENESIS OF NEGOTIATIONS

In 1990, when the National party invited the ANC to begin negotiations on a new constitution, the government's collapse did not seem imminent. At that point neither the ANC nor any other opposition group posed an immediate threat to the government.

Why, then, did the government begin negotiations? Both it and the ANC agreed that the country needed to make the transition to democracy. The government adopted this position after it became obvious that its efforts in the 1980s to rid the country of radical opposition groups by imposing sweeping repressive measures had failed. Moreover, international economic sanctions were beginning to have a serious impact, as capital flight crippled the South African economy. Some analysts have argued that trade sanctions did not economically devastate the country and that South Africa's foreign trade actually grew while sanctions were in place. This may be true, but international financial sanctions were detrimental. When coupled with payment on South Africa's foreign debt, these led to a massive drain of capital that could not be replaced.<sup>1</sup>

Economic distress alone did not force the government to begin discussions with groups it had vowed never to talk to. Internal resistance grew during the 1980s and became largely impervious to the government's efforts to contain it. The revolts of the 1980s, unlike previous waves of protests by black South Africans, lasted much longer and were more widespread. Between 1984 and 1986, when the resistance reached its zenith, consumer and rent boycotts swept the country, causing a great deal of harm and provoking black communities to take part in ongoing confrontations with the authorities. The government finally realized that it could no longer end the protests in black communities unilaterally—black South Africans' demands had to be addressed. This made it possible for the National party

government to approve negotiations with civic associations in an attempt to end the rent boycotts.

The ANC also found it increasingly difficult to wage its guerrilla war against the government. The spectacular armed campaigns of the late 1970s and early 1980s began to taper off toward the end of the decade for many reasons, including changes throughout southern Africa. Mozambique, which borders South Africa and had assisted in the ANC's armed campaigns, was plagued by attacks from South Africa and a debilitating war against an insurgency largely supported by South Africa. The war's effects finally led Mozambique to sign the 1984 Nkomati Accord, a nonaggression pact in which it and South Africa agreed to stop aiding each other's enemies. As a result of the accord, the ANC lost its bases in Mozambique; South Africa, however, continued to support the Mozambican resistance.

This particular incident marked the first success of South Africa's policy of destabilizing neighboring countries that supported the ANC. Other countries in the region, such as Botswana and Angola, though militarily weak, were also attacked and thus persuaded to refrain from providing assistance to the ANC. The result was a marked reduction in the ANC's crossborder military actions against South Africa.

However, ANC guerrilla actions had already begun to wind down. Since the formation in 1983 of the United Democratic Front—a group that included about 600 civic associations, religious organizations, and trade unions—the ANC had begun to shift the focus of resistance from externally based military actions to joining the Front's domestic political activities.

Another factor that slowly brought the white government to the negotiating table was the growing international outcry over apartheid. The repressive measures the government had successfully used against regional adversaries were turned against the internal resistance. The international community responded with harsher sanctions and pressured the government to change.

The government and the ANC also found themselves pushed toward negotiations because of the changed international environment at the end of the cold war. The collapse of the Soviet Union was an especially critical event for the ANC since it had long enjoyed Soviet support. With the termination of that support and the shift in the ANC's focus, the group was left with little choice but to negotiate with the government.

By the end of the 1980s the major actors in the South African conflict had, by different routes, reached a com-

mon conclusion: that a resolution of the country's political impasse through negotiations should be explored. The government agreed to talk while it was still in a strong position and before its power had so eroded that negotiations would be no more than a discussion on transferring power. Since it remains powerful, it has the ability to determine the outcome of talks. Yet the government still faces the problem of legitimacy: To the majority of the country's citizens, who do not have the right to vote, the government is an imposition.

The ANC has also finally concluded that the only way forward is to negotiate a democratic dispensation. Although it enjoys widespread support, the group is outside the government and unable to implement its policies. Until nonracial elections are held, the ANC cannot transform this support into power. Between now and then many issues must be resolved.

## CODESA AND THE DIFFICULTIES IT FACES

Real negotiations began in earnest in December 1991 with the opening of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). But the historic meeting of 19 groups got off to a rocky start. The government and the ANC opened the convention with a bitter exchange between President F. W. de Klerk and ANC leader Mandela after de Klerk criticized the ANC for agreeing only to suspend armed struggle instead of abandoning the strategy altogether; he also said the ANC should dissolve Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), the group's military wing. In another major initial setback, two other participants—the Inkatha Freedom party, the largely Zulu-based party led by Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, and the government of Bophuthatswana, one of the independent “homelands”—refused to sign the declaration of intent, which was to act as the founding document for the negotiating process. The Bophuthatswana delegate said the declaration had not first been presented to the parliament of Bophuthatswana and thus weakened the homeland's sovereignty. The Inkatha Freedom party argued that by referring to a united South Africa, the declaration was prejudiced against those in the negotiations who might want to push for a federal constitution.

Many of the parties participating in CODESA are drawn from the tricameral Parliament and the homelands.<sup>2</sup> The criteria used to invite participants to the conference were not clear, and that lack of clarity remains. Based on the groups that are currently participating, three possible criteria emerge.

The first is founded on the National party's belief that groups wanting to participate in CODESA must demonstrate “proven support.” Once they do so, they must be invited to the conference. Proven support is determined by the number of votes a group has won in either a past homeland or tricameral parliamentary election. The second criterion is that a group should be responsible for the administration of a government. This would explain

<sup>2</sup>Under the Constitution Act of 1983, Parliament consists of three houses: the House of Assembly for the white population, the House of Delegates for the Asian population, and the House of Representatives for the Coloured (mixed-race) population. Each house passes legislation on issues that affect its racial group. The three act jointly on issues such as defense, foreign affairs, and economic policy.

the participation of three homeland governments—those of Venda, Transkei, and Ciskei—that came to power through military coups, and therefore cannot demonstrate proven support. The third is undefined but allows for the participation of long-standing radical opponents of the government, such as the ANC. The actual support for each of these groups is unknown, except for the paid membership or support claimed.

More than 20 other groups, all claiming to enjoy a substantial following in the country, have applied for representation at CODESA. This flurry of interest in the convention raises the question of how participation is to be determined in the future. Aside from the notion of proven support, there are several competing views on how to evaluate representation. The ANC argues that participation should be limited to bona fide political parties or organizations. Inkatha does not disagree with this, but insists that the Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelethini, must also be represented. The group reasons that because negotiations on a new constitution will inevitably affect boundaries, a king cannot be excluded from decision making that affects his kingdom and subjects. This rationale has apparently persuaded other traditional leaders to demand representation at CODESA. Church groups, white right-wing groups, trade unions, and a variety of other groups are also making bids for representation.

More ominous, however, is the absence at CODESA of groups known to enjoy a measure of popular support. Their support is not broad enough to enable them to prevent negotiations from proceeding, but it is strong enough that they could create problems if they do not agree with the outcome of the conference. Two of these groups, the left-wing Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Conservative party, were invited to participate in the conference but declined to do so. Like the ANC, PAC has campaigned abroad to end apartheid and has developed a military capability that it has used in the past to try to overthrow the South African government. The Conservative party's political base is second only to that of the National party, and its electoral base includes two provinces, Transvaal and Orange Free State, where it controls a majority of local authorities. The party could easily link up with other, more radical white right-wing groups. Such a combination could be devastating because apartheid has given whites easier access to strategic sites and installations. Their potential to initiate violence is therefore far beyond that of black guerrilla armies.

Both PAC and the Conservatives have advanced preconditions for participating in CODESA. PAC argues that the only issue on the agenda in talks with the National party government should be a transfer of power to the black majority. At other times it has said the agenda should be limited to discussing only a constituent assembly. Once elected the assembly would draw up a constitution, which would transform South

Africa into a democracy. This view of events does not take other outcomes into consideration, including the possibility that the National party might garner more votes than PAC.

The Conservative party is wedded to classical apartheid—although the party now acknowledges that whites have no inherent right to rule over blacks. The party, nevertheless, assumes that the homelands policy must be accepted by blacks because it is through these so-called independent states that blacks can fulfill their right to self-determination. The Conservative party's definition of self-determination for blacks reflects the Conservatives' own beliefs on the issue and is designed to promote their interests. Bending over backwards to accommodate either PAC or the Conservatives will undermine the objective of negotiating South Africa's eventual democratization.

### THE MARCH REFERENDUM

On February 19, 1992, the National party lost a by-election to the Conservative party in the town of Potchefstroom in Transvaal, and had to give up what was previously considered a "safe" parliamentary seat. De Klerk reacted within days by calling for a whites-only referendum on March 17 on whether the government should continue the negotiation process; if negotiations were rejected, he said, he would resign and call general elections.

The Potchefstroom results represented only the latest in a series of Conservative victories over the National party (the other losses since the 1989 general election were in towns in Orange Free State and Cape and Natal provinces). The Potchefstroom victory allowed the Conservatives to proclaim that the National party no longer represented the views of the majority of voters. After all, in the 1989 election Conservatives won enough seats in Parliament to become a formidable opposition.

De Klerk's decision to call a referendum confused the government's opponents. The ANC was caught between its standing rejection of a racially based referendum and the reason de Klerk gave for calling this one: that a referendum would test which party should represent the views of white South Africans at CODESA. The ANC had previously argued that the groups negotiating at the convention must be able to prove that they truly represent their constituency; thus the National party was in a sense holding the referendum to see who indeed represented white South Africa. The ambiguity with which the ANC responded to de Klerk's call was also based on its resentment of the white right wing's rejection of negotiations.

The call for the referendum also surprised the white right wing, which had had little time to celebrate the victory in Potchefstroom before de Klerk made his announcement. The referendum was presented to it as an opportunity to prove its claim that a majority of the white community supported its point of view. After ini-



tially contemplating a boycott of the referendum—saying it was not given an opportunity to help frame the question on the ballot—the white right wing wholeheartedly joined the fray.

The referendum results showed that a strong 68.7 percent of the white electorate favored negotiations (most analysts expected no more than a 60 percent approval rate). Because of the unexpectedly large margin of victory, two schools of opinion on the negotiation process have emerged. One holds that the National party has been strengthened and will now argue that the yes vote means white South Africans overwhelmingly support the constitutional proposals it has made at CODESA and that the other groups at the convention should as well. This argument is bolstered by de Klerk's public commitment not to call another whites-only referendum. He evidently believes that if CODESA accepts the government's constitutional proposals largely as presented, there will be no need to seek further approval from white voters. If, however, a new constitution departs drastically from the government's proposals, another whites-only test may be unavoidable. The second point of view contends that the large number of yes votes will force the government to move swiftly toward a settlement at CODESA.

Some members of the white right wing have said the referendum's outcome is meaningless. They argue that their right to self-determination cannot be voted away and that they are willing to fight for this right. The Conservative party has attributed the referendum's success to blackmail by foreign governments, the media, and South African big business. But the party's legitimacy has been undermined, and it is unlikely that Conservatives will recover from the loss suffered. The party may split, with some members taking part in CODESA and negotiating their right to self-determination—that is, a white homeland—and others deciding to physically fight for that right.

Another view that has been articulated since the referendum—but should have been anticipated before it—is that the 30 percent of the white electorate who rejected negotiations is too large a group to be ignored. The naysayers will not accept a negotiated outcome that has as its starting point the idea that whites and blacks can share common political institutions. Proponents of this view say CODESA must respect this group's desire for self-determination, regardless of whether right-wing organizations participate in the convention. Otherwise, they say, it is unlikely that there will be peace in postapartheid South Africa.

## THE NATIONAL PARTY'S STRONG HAND

As long as the process of change in the country remains merely at the liberalization stage, the National party will be the strongest group at CODESA. Control over the government gives it power far in excess of its popular support, allowing it to determine the speed,

nature, and timing of change. In effect, the party's control of the government allows it the dual role of player and referee in the negotiations. All opposition groups agree that these roles should be kept separate. The argument, advanced principally by the ANC, that a constituent assembly should be elected to write a new constitution, and that a multiracial interim government should be appointed by CODESA while the new constitution is being written, rests on the view that the National party is unlikely to be neutral in the negotiating process.

For its part, the National party is firmly opposed to the election of a constituent assembly at this point because it would create a constitutional void. The party has said the present constitution must be repealed by legal means and a new one enacted by a duly constituted authority. And the National party government has declared that it will not allow the introduction of an interim government by stealth.

The National party is determined to keep the current government in place until a new one is formed in the course of the negotiating process. Moreover, since the agreements reached at CODESA must be submitted to the tricameral Parliament for approval, the success of the enterprise is dependent on the National party's goodwill. The party enjoys majorities in two of the three houses of Parliament, and it is assumed that it will push through Parliament legislation consistent with agreements reached in the negotiations. However, there is no guarantee that Parliament will indeed adopt legislation that legally sanctions agreements reached at CODESA.

The National party's version of an interim government differs considerably from that of the ANC. In the party's view, an interim government should be elected rather than appointed. In addition, the interim government should be subordinate to Parliament and constituted through a power-sharing arrangement.

Power sharing for the National party means the sharing of power at all levels of government among major parties, which should be provided for in the new constitution. The National party believes that this would effectively ensure that no one group can dominate the others. This rendition of an interim government would not affect the National party's control of the country, since Parliament would continue to be the final legislative authority. Thus the National party could determine what is eventually passed into law.

An interim constitution for the interim government, the party proposes, should be drawn up by groups at CODESA. After the interim constitution is written, it would be put before the people in a referendum. The National party has further proposed that this interim government remain in place for at least 10 years.

While the National party has conceded that all racial groups in the country should participate in the proposed referendum on an interim constitution, the voting rolls would be racially based—that is, people from different

race groups would be placed on separate voting rolls. The party insists that this must be done to test white opinion and to fulfill a promise de Klerk made in 1991 when he initiated the negotiation process, namely that white voters would be asked for their views in a referendum on the direction the country was taking—a promise he has kept once with the March referendum.

Naturally this has brought negative responses from most black opposition groups, including the ANC, which have argued that whites should not be given veto power in the negotiation process. Indeed this seems to be a right to veto the process, since if the white electorate votes no in such a referendum, the National party has suggested that the entire process would have to be reconsidered. No indication has been given as to what the government's reaction would be if all other groups view the issue differently; presumably the views of other groups are not critical.

Opposition groups are so opposed to the idea of a referendum structured along racial lines that they may advocate a boycott if it is held. It is conceivable that if a boycott were organized, a decision on the negotiations would be made on the results of the whites-only referendum. In the past, boycotts of elections have been organized by black opposition groups and have had only a slight impact on white voting patterns.

## THE POSTAPARTHEID NATIONAL PARTY

The National party seems as concerned with preserving its own power in the current negotiations as it is with the negotiations themselves. Many radical black opponents of the government believe that the regime is negotiating not to give up power completely and allow the establishment of an unfettered democracy. Rather, it is trying to expand democracy by allowing hitherto excluded groups to participate in government and simultaneously to limit that democracy by insisting on its own participation in the postapartheid future. The National party, they believe, will use its powerful position to structure the transition to ensure it a place in future postapartheid governments.

The party intends to achieve the same goal with the power-sharing constitutional formula, which will in effect perpetuate the group-rights idea it advanced in the 1980s and was thought to have abandoned. Power sharing would most likely encourage racially and ethnically based parties, since it would enshrine in the constitution access to power by parties with majorities in these groups. Moreover, power sharing may make it difficult for a postapartheid government to agree on, let alone implement, policies.

The National party insists that during the transition

period the current government should remain in power until a new one is elected and a new constitution agreed on. Its insistence that existing institutions like Parliament oversee the process until new ones are created may be a way of ensuring that the old apartheid institutions play a role in giving birth to the new postapartheid institutions. Continuity will thus be maintained, which would increase the chances of the National party's inclusion in a future government.

Other measures undertaken by the government, including its handling of the recent violence in black communities and the restructuring of its foreign and socioeconomic policies, support the conclusion that the National party is structuring the process of negotiations to ensure it a place in a postapartheid government.

Observations that violence in black townships is mainly black-on-black has largely obscured the role the government, through its security forces, has played or refrained from playing. In fact, there is compelling evidence that the government has provided training to people who have been involved in violence in the townships.<sup>3</sup>

On many occasions the police have failed to arrest those involved in violent acts even when there is adequate information on who initiated the violence. Some incidents have been captured by television cameras, revealing the identities of those involved. But this has not led to their arrest or prosecution, despite the South African police force's past prowess in enforcing apartheid laws. It also contrasts with police attitudes and investigations when the government was threatened by armed guerrillas of the ANC, PAC, and the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania. Then, arrests were often made and defendants successfully prosecuted. Yet in an October 1991 incident involving an attack on a train in which the police failed to arrest any of the attackers, commuters themselves arrested them, at great personal risk. Two months later the attackers had still not been brought to trial, and no official explanation has been put forward.

In its foreign policy the government has expanded relations with a growing number of countries, almost doubling its diplomatic representation in the last two years. President de Klerk and Foreign Minister Roelof Botha have been warmly received in more than two dozen countries. The government has been meticulous about presenting itself abroad as the only group that can hold South Africa together, and has argued that black groups are fighting each other because they are jockeying for power. This is consistent with the prevailing view of black-on-black violence in the townships, and might be extremely powerful in shaping foreign perceptions of the ability of black groups to govern South Africa. At the same time it might strengthen the assertion that if the National party does not play a role in government, the country could degenerate into unresolvable strife.

At home, the government has greatly increased

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, the *Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg), October 4–10, 1991, and *New Nation* (Johannesburg), October 18–24, 1991.

spending for public housing, health care, and education. While this is long overdue and the government should be lauded for finally making resources available to address problems that have reached crisis proportions, government opponents have objected to the manner in which resources have been distributed. The ANC and a group called the Development Forum have charged that some projects have received priority funding because they enhance the government's political standing.

Development agencies, especially the Independent Development Trust (IDT) and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), have also been accused of adopting a nondemocratic approach in handling development in the black communities, an accusation sharpened by the racial overtones surrounding development efforts in the country. The development agencies control large and varied sources of funds and are run by whites with no visible black participation at the policy-making level. The only role blacks have in the process is as recipients of aid from these institutions.

Domestic opponents of the South African government have also raised concerns about the lifting of sanctions. Attempts by the IDT and the DBSA to obtain funding through international loans are seen by the opposition as an attempt to undermine sanctions. By saying they are raising funds for socioeconomic development aimed at assisting black communities, the two agencies hope to gain access to foreign capital markets and thus finally ensure the collapse of sanctions. The two agencies vehemently deny this charge, and say they are merely trying to obtain funding from all available sources.

## **PROSPECTS**

CODESA and divisions in the white community take place against a backdrop of escalating violence and an economy in disarray. The increased black-on-black violence is especially disturbing. In some black townships it

has led to the virtual collapse of law enforcement; armed gangs have become a law unto themselves. Violence is no longer only politically motivated but has become pathological. Violent crime has increased to the point that incidents now average 50 per week in some of the worst-hit black townships. South Africa will find that even if a democratic constitution acceptable to all is crafted, brutalization has been so extensive that it will take a long time to restore respect for law and order.

Moreover, the economy has continued to decline, raising questions about the possibility of delivering a democratic constitution into an economic environment that cannot support the new entrants to a democratic polity. Control of the economy remains hopelessly concentrated in a few white-owned conglomerates. Virtually all senior positions in major companies, private and public, are controlled by whites. The persistent call by the black opposition for the nationalization of private assets is partly an attempt to address this imbalance. In addition, unemployment has continued to rise, making available young men for employment as "conflict entrepreneurs"—that is, armed thugs—in the black townships. And with the repeal of the pass laws, many blacks have left the homelands for urban areas, severely straining city services.

At this stage in the negotiating process, the National party is using its considerable power to ensure that its constituency retains a foothold in government. In the short term it will probably succeed. The immense support it has received from Western governments, who look on it as the party that finally opened the way for a negotiated settlement, makes it easier to fashion a settlement that suits its needs. The party's control of the security forces will also make it possible to structure the transition in a manner that is least threatening to the party. In the long term, however, it is difficult to see how the party can sustain a constitution designed mainly with this purpose in mind. ■



"By the year 2000, approximately 25 million Africans" could be infected with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. "How can one begin to discuss the broad implications of HIV infection and AIDS for the poorest continent on earth, where average annual government health-care expenditures are about \$2 for each man, woman, and child?"

# The AIDS Pandemic in Africa

BY DENNIS C. WEEKS

**D**oes AIDS represent a cataclysm for Africa? The fatal disease has spread throughout the continent quickly in the last ten years, and the potential impact over the next decade is nothing short of devastating—given no development of a vaccine, no cure, and no dramatic increase in the availability of life-extending medications and treatment.

The numbers themselves are frightening. In July 1990, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that there were approximately 8 million HIV-infected adults worldwide, of whom approximately 3 million were women and 5 million were men. In July 1991 the agency estimated the total at between 10 million and 12 million HIV-positive individuals. Seven months later, on February 12, 1992, revised WHO figures put the global total at 12 million, of whom 1 million are children who

are not yet sexually active.<sup>1</sup> Of this global total, 7.5 million, or 62.5 percent, are Africans. Among the world's infected female population, at least 81 percent, or more than 3.7 million, reside in Africa, while approximately 52 percent, or 3.8 million, of the world's HIV-infected males are Africans.

WHO estimates that within the next five years the number infected globally will at least double and possibly triple; it further estimates that by the year 2000 at least 30 million people will be infected throughout the world, with some experts expecting closer to 40 million. Infants and children will account for up to 10 million of the total, and there will be approximately 10 million AIDS orphans—children whose parents have died from AIDS.

If the gender ratios remain constant, more than 15 million females and 25 million males will be infected with HIV by the year 2000. Furthermore, if the same geographical distribution patterns hold, the number of infected African females could exceed 12 million while infected African males could reach 13 million. Thus by the year 2000 approximately 25 million Africans, representing five out of every eight global infections, or nearly 63 percent, could be expected.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>WHO's data estimates are released too infrequently to be realistic and are inadequate for purposes of intervention program planning because of the speed at which the AIDS pandemic is progressing. Applying the 1990 global ratio of 3 infected women for every 5 infected men to the July 1991 WHO estimates of infected adults would mean that at least 4,125,000 women and 6,875,000 men are HIV-positive, along with another million children, approximately half boys and half girls.

<sup>2</sup>There are reasons to suspect that the African experience could become more extreme than current ratios indicate. Merely extrapolating current data gives too low an impression because the data themselves are too low, among other reasons discussed in the next section.

<sup>3</sup>This assessment is based on the most recent figures available from the United States Bureau of the Census, Health Studies Branch of the Center for International Research; they were released in November 1991 and cover data collected through 1990.

## CHARTING THE IMPACT OF AIDS

Uganda is the African country that has been hardest hit by AIDS.<sup>3</sup> An ongoing study of pregnant women in the capital city of Kampala, begun in the mid-1980s, shows that the infection rate increased from nearly 11 percent of pregnant women in 1985 to more than 25 percent today. The women studied are considered a low-risk group; those in a high-risk group—prostitutes and others with many sexual partners—had a 75 percent infection rate. Outside major cities in Uganda, current infection rates approximate the 1985 major city rate, with a wave of infection moving toward the rural areas.

Other countries with seriously high rates of HIV infection among low-risk populations in major cities include Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia. Among these countries, Burundi appears to have the

## THE PATHOLOGY OF AIDS

AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome) results from infection with HIV (human immunodeficiency virus). A person who is infected with HIV is commonly referred to as being HIV-positive, which means that antibodies to HIV are present in that person's blood. This does not mean that the person has AIDS. A significant period of time will elapse, usually many years, from the time of infection with HIV until the person develops AIDS. General exceptions to that statement are infants who are born infected and usually die within 24 months after birth.

The time between initial HIV infection, followed by symptomatic HIV illness such as thrush or Kaposi's sarcoma, and a subsequent diagnosis of AIDS varies widely and depends on many factors, some of which are related to location. In the United States and Western Europe, the time span between HIV infection and diagnosis of AIDS is approximately seven years and lengthening. In Africa the period can be shorter, and further studies will offer a clearer timeframe.\*

There is currently no cure for or vaccine against AIDS, which gradually debilitates an individual by reducing the body's natural ability to fight diseases such as pneumonia, tuberculosis (TB), and diarrhea, for which there are common, effective therapies. The prospects for developing a vaccine are not encouraging, and most experts do not expect one until the end of the century.

Several strains of the virus have been discovered, and the two strains that account for nearly all infection in Africa are referred to as HIV-1 and HIV-2. While both strains are found to some extent in most African countries, HIV-1 is predominant in eastern and southern Africa, and HIV-2 is responsible for virtually all infection in western Africa. (HIV-1 is the strain almost exclusively found in the United States and Europe.)

HIV can be transmitted three different ways:

- via infected blood through transfusions or unsterilized surgical instruments and hypodermic needles;
- from mother to infant, either through intrauterine transfer of blood or fluids or through mothers' milk by breast-feeding;
- transfer of bodily fluids, primarily semen and vaginal secretions generated by sexual activity.

Infection through the transfer of blood or blood products usually occurs because they have not been cleansed of the virus before transfusion or injection. (A common practice that many Africans believe provides energy is receiving a pint of blood from another person.) Transmission through unsterilized needles occurs most often through reuse or group-use of needles that should be disposed of after one use. This method of transmission is not a major concern in Africa, since intravenous drug use on the continent is extremely rare, although it is a major problem in the United States, Europe, and some parts of Asia and Latin America.

Surgical instruments, which in Africa include knives and razor blades, can also become sources of transmission when there is inadequate sterilization, and when the same instrument is used on many people in succession without sterilization. In Africa this occurs during semiannual or annual village circumcision rites that can include as many as 100 youths. Scarification ceremonies, frequently associated with puberty, also include many individuals. However, transmission through blood or blood products accounts for perhaps as little as 5 percent of total African AIDS cases.

Another form of transmission occurs from mother to infant.\*\* Although most infections occur at birth, a small proportion are caused by breast-feeding. Although numerically insignificant at this time—less than 5 percent of the total—there has been recent speculation that transmission through breast-feeding might be more efficient than thought earlier. If true, this could have serious implications for the successful campaigns to promote breast-feeding as the best means of providing biological immunization and high nutrition, a natural method of child spacing with positive health implications for mothers, and a reduction in consumption of infant formula, which is often mixed with contaminated water. Panic could drive mothers to resist breast-feeding, whether or not they are HIV-positive.

More than 90 percent of HIV transmission worldwide is the result of transfer of bodily fluids between sexual partners through sexual intercourse. Since homosexuality and bisexuality appear to be rare in Africa, and have not been well researched, there is wide agreement among experts that nearly all HIV transmission in Africa is the result of heterosexual activity. ■

\*Many think that in Africa a combination of factors such as water-borne diseases, malaria, tuberculosis, sexually transmitted diseases, parasites, lack of proper medical care, and a dearth of the most basic medicines, account for the shorter period between infection with HIV, diagnosis of AIDS, and death.

\*\*Transmission from mother to infant occurs when the mother is either HIV-positive or has AIDS. The rate at which infants are infected through contact with the bodily fluids of their infected mothers ranges between 25 and 50 percent, which means that of every 100 infants born to mothers with either HIV infection or AIDS, as many as 50 will themselves be infected at or shortly after birth.

lowest rate of infection of low-risk groups in major cities, at nearly 18 percent, while the others show rates in excess of 22 percent, with Rwanda and Zambia at or above 25 percent. High-risk urban populations in those same countries have infection rates ranging from 18 percent in Burundi to 80 percent in Rwanda; most have rates between 40 and 60 percent. Other African countries that appear to have infection rates between 5 and 10 percent in low-risk urban populations include the Central African Republic, Congo, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Senegal.

The available data describing African HIV infection rates are not very reliable, and probably underestimate infection levels. Most African governments have denied AIDS is a problem in their countries, fearing that tourists would abandon plans to visit, which would disrupt the flow of hard currency. The denial is so extensive that data for rates of HIV infection and/or AIDS are not available from many African countries.

Statistics from some African countries show a reduction in the rate of increase of infection and death. Often

this merely demonstrates that hospitals are already operating beyond capacity and are not accepting more patients. After being rejected by hospitals and clinics, many people stricken with AIDS simply return home, so their illnesses and deaths are not included in the data. Conversely, initially high rates of infection might reflect implementation of data-gathering systems, followed by a more accurate accounting of morbidity and mortality.


The governments that have been the most aggressive in acknowledging the presence of AIDS in their country were also the first to receive technical and financial assistance from WHO's Global Program on AIDS. WHO's assistance in most cases led to the development of plans to fight AIDS in those countries. The earlier the assistance was received and plans developed, the more extensive are the data-reporting systems now in place. Two examples are Uganda and Zambia, which allowed the development of AIDS education and prevention strategies.

Data are the foundation on which successful programs are built. Because some countries have shown early initiative in acknowledging the presence of AIDS, their relatively well-developed reporting systems give the appearance that they have higher rates of infection than their neighbors. But a more realistic assumption is that countries bordering other countries with highly infected populations also have high rates of infection.

Only a handful of African governments have reliable data on infection rates in rural populations. The rural data that do exist, however, show a worrisome trend toward higher and growing rates of transmission. Most Africans live in rural areas—as much as 85 percent of the total population in many countries—which means that the spread of AIDS into the rural population will heighten the tragedy. Most programs have targeted urban-based Africans, with specific emphasis on locations where many people are in one place at the same time, such as workplaces. With the exceptions of religious institutions and some agriculturally oriented cooperative societies, opportunities for informing large groups at one time about the facts of AIDS, and its transmission and prevention, are relatively limited in rural Africa. Compounding the difficulties are the linguistic and tribal barriers to communicating with large numbers of rural residents.

## HEALTH CARE AND AIDS

How can one begin to discuss the broad implications of HIV infection and AIDS for the poorest continent on earth, where average annual government health-care expenditures are about \$2 for each man, woman, and child? How does a continent cope with nearly 10 million AIDS orphans by the turn of the century, of which there are already nearly 500,000 in Uganda alone, and the number is growing rapidly in areas surrounding Lake Victoria in Tanzania? How will countries cope with the possible decimation of the extended African family? How can these orphaned and abandoned children sus-





tain their physical and mental health if there is no one to take care of them? What means exist to help these children care for their parents, many of whom are dying of AIDS?

The hopelessness of the situation can be seen by looking at conditions at Kampala's Mulago hospital, where for several years the only AIDS clinic in Uganda has had no medication to offer those who are diagnosed with the disease, and where the staff has refused to assist women to deliver their infants because of a lack of rubber gloves and footwear. Most AIDS sufferers, already in poor health by the time they are diagnosed, simply drift back to their village or to the village where their father or mother was born, to die. Many are not taken in by their relatives because of the stigma and fear of the disease, and after they die their children are often left to fend for themselves.


A broader look at African health issues is helpful in understanding the context in which AIDS is viewed by Africans. In countries where malaria is a constant scourge and new strains continue to resist available drugs and weaken immunity developed over decades, and where diarrheal disease kills hundreds of thousands of both young and elderly each year, it has been reasonable for governments to pay more attention to traditional health threats than to a new, relatively unknown or unheard-of disease. For example, at the height of the recent drought, as many as 500,000 people were expected to die in a year from the drought's effects. At the same time, more than 500,000 children in Nigeria alone were dying each year from malaria and water-borne disease. Conditions similar to those in Nigeria, although with fewer deaths, are common throughout the continent. AIDS is just another disease in the eyes of Africans, policymaker and simple citizen alike, until the rate of infection reaches the point that members of their families, coworkers and next-door neighbors start dying. In

many cities in eastern, central, and southern Africa, most people have already experienced those situations.

Governments and individual leaders have reacted predictably to pressures from long-established social and religious institutions that have argued against the development and implementation of AIDS education and prevention programs that emphasize open discussion of sexual behavior, long a taboo even between parent and child. In many countries where AIDS education and prevention programs have proposed the use of condoms as one way of slowing

transmission, responses have included open hostility from both political and religious leaders. Such programs have also generated confusion among Africans who have neither seen nor heard of condoms, who are embarrassed and angry when they are first exposed to them, and who interpret condom promotion as an attempt to develop a profitable market for an unpopular and unwanted item.

Two other health-care problems closely related to AIDS are traditional sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and tuberculosis (TB). HIV and



Source: World Health Organization, Global Program on AIDS (Geneva, January 1992).

other STDs amplify each other's effects. Experts estimate that there is a very low likelihood of transmitting HIV from a single episode of vaginal intercourse. If, however, one of the parties is already infected with another STD at the time of that single episode—especially chancroid or syphilis, both of which can cause lesions—the risk of transmitting HIV is up to 50 times greater. WHO collected data from women visiting prenatal clinics in 10 African countries and found that the prevalence of syphilis ranged between 10 and 20 percent. Rapid increases in HIV infection in the neighborhoods of those clinics and escalating rates of fetal death and infant mortality will no doubt follow.

Tuberculosis, perhaps the world's leading killer and certainly among the top three, has resurfaced in areas

long considered safe. The link between TB and AIDS is clear and made more critical by a new, drug-resistant strain occurring in some populations with high levels of HIV infection. In Africa the number of current cases of active TB has created an epidemic similar in size to that of AIDS. The potential impact of TB is dramatized by the fact that most practicing health-care professionals have no experience with TB except through textbooks, there has been little research on it, and the disease is spread through coughs and sneezes. Health-care professionals in the United States, which is also experiencing an increase in TB, have begun discussing whether to reopen sanitariums once used for TB patients and to quarantine people with active TB. Africa, too, must prepare for potentially devastating effects of the disease.

### THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AIDS

Quantitative studies of the economic impact AIDS has had on Africa are generally unavailable. However, broad areas of impact are obvious, including both the direct and indirect costs associated with AIDS in the workplace and the health-care and psychological costs to society.

The private sector's economic health in the African countries hardest hit by AIDS had been marginal at best even before the malady became a problem. Except for the banking and insurance industries, corporations are just beginning to emerge from prolonged retrenchment and the debt accumulated through borrowing for capital improvements and expansion during the 1970s and 1980s. It is now time for most industries to rebuild or replace their plants and equipment, and the lack of financial resources prevents them from doing so.

American reluctance to invest in Africa, in spite of the fact that investment codes are the most lenient in nearly 25 years and that return on investment is greater across Africa than it has been since the early 1960s, leads to the conclusion that Africa is not attractive to American investors for reasons other than standard calculations of return on investment. European investment in Africa, historically bolder and more effective than American investment on the continent, also seems to be on hold. Asian investment on the continent continues at the most rapid pace, but in the face of slowing economies at home, it is not likely to remain as rapid, with the exception of the export markets targeted by Asian manufacturers of vehicles and spare parts.

An example of the position Africa holds in the minds of non-African investors becomes clear from a mid-February 1992 announcement in major financial publications that the treasurer of the World Bank, Donald C. Roth, will soon resign in order to form the Emerging Markets Corporation, a private venture.<sup>4</sup> He will be joined by a former chairman of Salomon Brothers and a former senior vice president of the World Bank, with

financing partly provided by the United States-based Bankers Trust Company. The announcements listed the targets of the new venture as eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Not one word was mentioned about Africa, even though approximately \$100 billion is expected to be invested in developing country firms worldwide by the year 2000, up from approximately \$20 billion at the end of 1990.

When AIDS is introduced into the profit picture of African industry, the disease covers it like a dark cloud. The loss of industry's top layer of African managers—often the only layer of African managers—compounded by the persistent reduction of members of the most energetic component of the nonmanagement workforce, carries high direct and indirect costs. After years of careful selection and training, the loss of managers can leave an organization without leadership and unable to remain competitive. High prospective death rates for nonmanagement workers, especially those between 18 and 35 years of age, could create a labor shortage resulting in bidding wars for those able to work, thereby escalating labor costs.

Hospital, clinic, and pharmaceutical expenses, death benefits to surviving family members, burials, transport costs, time off for coworkers to attend funeral services, grief leave, recruitment and training costs associated with a replacement workforce, and higher insurance premiums are examples of direct costs due to AIDS that must be absorbed by organizations just barely able to function without it. In addition, there are indirect costs that may prove even more important over the long run. Among them are decreasing productivity because of fear and sadness associated with death and dying; dissension and discrimination at the workplace because of the incorrect belief that HIV infection and AIDS are transmitted through casual contact; and the lack of a clearly stated organizational policy concerning infected workers.

As AIDS continues to spread throughout Africa and the rest of the world, business decision makers must recognize that the disease can make their organizations dysfunctional and, eventually, defunct. Parent companies based in the United States, Europe, and Asia need to protect their investments and most important resource—human capital—through aggressive AIDS education and prevention programs, with follow-up activities directed at counseling and treatment of the sick and dying and their survivors. Government decision makers must incorporate similar tactics to ensure that civil services and state-owned businesses remain viable.

### HOPE IN MANY FORMS

Relative wealth will define the long-term, global distribution of HIV infection and AIDS-related deaths. While there is neither a vaccine against nor a cure for AIDS, state-of-the-art treatment is approaching the point that within a short time, perhaps as soon as two years, the availability of and access to medical and psycholog-

<sup>4</sup>The New York Times, February 13, 1992, p. D4.

ical treatment for those who are HIV-positive or have AIDS could sustain life indefinitely.

Most developed countries now provide the health care and medications that can slow the progression from HIV infection to AIDS and eventual death. There is little likelihood that those at the lower end of the global socioeconomic scale will benefit from life-prolonging treatment in the foreseeable future. This is especially true for the countries of Africa. Human vaccine trials set to begin within two years in at least two African countries (one of which is Uganda) might offer some hope, but a vaccine will not be available globally until early in the next century. Thus simple economic truths ensure that Africa will bear an increasingly disproportionate share of the impact of AIDS.

Given the relatively bleak picture painted so far, is there hope for Africa? Yes, in many forms, one of which comes from outside the continent. Donor countries and organizations have always provided assistance, and in the case of the AIDS pandemic assistance has appeared from throughout the world in a bewildering array of goods and services. The efficiency with which foreign assistance is offered and delivered, however, is frustrating. At times the requirements of donors are as confusing to recipients as the range of aid offered. Competing interests and overlap have meant that delivery and management of assistance is reduced, sometimes dramatically.

Of all the sources of AIDS assistance given to Africa, none comes close to the financial and technical inputs provided by the United States. Although other countries dedicate larger portions of their gross domestic product to foreign assistance, the amount of aid distributed by the United States dwarfs that of most others. In terms of AIDS assistance, WHO received more than \$77 million from donor contributions in 1990, nearly \$21 million of which was donated by the United States Agency for International Development (AID). Since 1986, AID, the largest financial supporter of WHO's Global Program on AIDS, has also donated more than \$91 million through bilateral assistance programs and another \$10 million from assorted AID accounts.

Another source of hope is that as medications for AIDS and AIDS-related illnesses are developed, they will eventually be made available for mass consumption at prices affordable to all, including Africans. But there will be a considerable time lag from initial availability of the medications until the research and development costs are recovered and prices thus decrease. The development costs of new products are high, but there are indications that firms with products now available are

assessing areas where they can make contributions toward alleviating AIDS-related problems.

The most important source of hope rests with Africans themselves. Innovative AIDS projects have been under way for several years in many African countries, funded in part by foreign donors. In many cases the projects have been "indigenized" as Africans have assumed decision-making roles and developed new programs. This ability to sustain projects is an important part of all AIDS activities.

African corporations that have agreed to develop AIDS-in-the-workplace programs that educate workers about the disease and its prevention have realized the importance of allowing employees time off for training and have donated space for meetings, provided transportation to training programs, and have even allowed and encouraged their executives to take the lead in work-based sessions.

Africans have shown an initial reluctance to embrace those parts of the training programs that focus on sensitive subjects never before discussed by them publicly, such as sexual practices and their related risks, or the merits of using condoms along with graphic descriptions of their proper use and disposal. Yet according to the AID Office of Population, the demand for condoms has increased more than five times since AIDS education programs began including descriptions of safer sex practices; in 1990 more than 176 million condoms were shipped to Africa by AID, up from 34 million in 1987. The increased demand must reflect a change in behavior on the part of Africans.

Another important objective of many AIDS programs is to change high-risk behavior, such as having many sexual partners, to low-risk behavior, such as having only one. Education that clearly discusses modes of transmission, including the use of unsterilized cutting instruments, has led village leaders to change the ways group circumcisions are performed. Africans have also taken the lead in developing messages about AIDS in effective formats, such as through films, dramas, music festivals, and competitions in dance, drama, and music. Some African leaders have aggressively led discussions about AIDS and have encouraged their political bodies to enact legislation to eliminate AIDS discrimination in jobs, education, and housing, and to encourage national education and prevention activities. Not all countries have openly joined the fight, but there is great hope that as the impact of AIDS on Africa is increasingly felt, Africans will demonstrate their resilience and insist on the development of innovative, effective ways of preventing AIDS from becoming the single greatest killer of Africans in the next 20 years. ■



**"With President Moi's announcement that the government would permit registration of opposition parties, Kenya regained not a multiparty system but the kind of regime in place in the late 1960s under Kenyatta.... [The] announcement did not represent a radical departure from single-party rule but merely a return to a set of rules that tolerated single-party dominance."**

## Kenya's Slow Progress toward Multiparty Politics

BY JENNIFER A. WIDNER

**I**n the wave of political change that swept Africa between 1989 and 1991, Kenya was one of the prominent holdouts as President Daniel arap Moi's government steadfastly resisted demands to legalize opposition parties. In July 1990 police detained two advocates of multiparty democracy—Kenneth Matiba, a former minister and member of parliament, and Charles Rubia, a member of parliament from Nairobi—just before they were to deliver a public speech. Matiba's lawyer, Gibson Kamau Kuria, took refuge in the United States embassy and subsequently found asylum in America.

In the months following, the government rounded up and imprisoned several other critics of Moi's single-party parliamentary system. Local governments and police razed shantytowns that allegedly harbored traders whose wares included controversial audiocassettes of political songs and speeches. The government eliminated some of its own members—most notably Foreign Minister Robert Ouko, who had voiced criticism of growing corruption at the top levels of government. A Scotland Yard investigation attributed Ouko's murder to at least one other high Cabinet official, Nicholas Biwott.

At the end of 1991, however, Kenya joined the swelling ranks of sub-Saharan African countries with multiparty systems. At a November meeting in Paris, donor nations voted to withhold aid to Kenya until the government could demonstrate improved respect for civil liberties and reduced levels of official corruption. On December 2, Moi announced that the government would allow opposition parties to organize, provided they registered to do so. (It has not clearly specified the rules for registration.) Moi stopped short of announcing a transition to a full-fledged

multiparty system or a date for elections, and hopes that he would allow elections quickly faded. Nonetheless, Kenya has ceased to be a holdout.

As with the other African governments that have legalized opposition parties during the last three years, the decision by the Moi government was the product of domestic and international pressure. In contrast to Zambia and many of Kenya's francophone neighbors, dissatisfied elites whose incomes had disappeared as a result of the economy's collapse played a relatively less significant role. Indeed, the degree to which important segments of Kenya's elite continued to benefit from patronage proved an obstacle to political reform.

### MOLDING THE SINGLE-PARTY STATE

Although Kenya became a *de facto* single-party state under its first president, nationalist leader Jomo Kenyatta, there was a shift in the character of authoritarian rule under Moi, who succeeded him. The governing party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), remained loosely organized and remote from policymaking before the president's death and Moi's accession in 1978. In 1982, Moi pushed legislation through the National Assembly that made Kenya a *de jure* single-party state under KANU. Beginning in 1985, KANU increasingly became an instrument of social control, with disciplinary mechanisms to restrict the views expressed by members, strengthened ability to screen electoral candidates, and a youth wing to monitor dissent in marketplaces. After a release of detainees during Moi's first months in office, the new government stepped up political repression and electoral interference.

During the mid-1980s the Moi regime took several steps to increase the discretion of the president in political affairs. In 1986 and 1988, the Office of the President won parliamentary passage of constitutional amendments that eliminated the security of tenure in office for the attorney general, the controller, the auditor, and judges of the High Court and Court of Appeal—thus removing

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the few remaining judicial checks on the power<sup>o</sup> of the chief executive.

The government also redrew the country's political boundaries, creating 30 new constituencies and increasing the number of members of parliament to 188 elected representatives, 12 nominated members, and 2 ex officio members. For the most part the new electoral districts corresponded to the areas of greatest population growth, but some clearly had political overtones. Nyeri district yielded three new constituencies, which split support for Wareru Kanja, a militant in the Mau Mau rebellion of 1952–1957, whom the president then perceived as a critic of the government. Opposition supporter Martin Shikuku's old constituency, Butere, was split in half between two districts in two different provinces.

Moi moved to replace incumbents in key security and government "gatekeeping" positions with men of his own choosing from his own ethnic group, the Kalenjin. Kalenjin became speaker of the National Assembly, head of the civil service, deputy army commander, and were appointed to many other posts. The Office of the President also filled an array of senior economic posts with Moi supporters, and Kalenjin in particular. The governorship of the Central Bank, the Ministry for Cooperative Development, the Ministry of Local Government, the head of the cooperatives commission, the chairmanships of the Kenya Commercial Bank and Kenya National Insurance, the directorships of Kenya Posts and Telecommunications, the Agricultural Development Corporation, Kenya Industrial Estates, the National Cereals and Produce Board, and the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, and other key posts fell to supporters who were Kalenjin.

The mid-1980s also saw increases in press censorship. In 1986 the government arrested and detained several journalists, and it confiscated editions of foreign and domestic publications containing articles on human rights, including *Africa Confidential*, *New African*, the *International Herald Tribune*, *Beyond!*, and *The Economist*. It also announced that it would review the work permits of more than 100 domestic and foreign correspondents.

## THE GOVERNMENT'S OPPONENTS

Domestic opposition to the Moi government arose from diverse sources. Some of the government's most outspoken opponents were from the country's business community. As time passed, Kenyans from other economic classes and points of view joined in calling for political reform.

Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba were the principal figures in the main, elite-directed opposition. During the

1970s, when some of Kenyatta's associates took steps to restrict the movements of Cabinet members with whom they disagreed, Rubia had played the role of moderate and quiet defender of civil liberties in parliament, speaking out, for example, against the withdrawal of passports from critics. As a Cabinet member in the 1970s, Rubia sat on the commission that investigated the 1975 assassination of populist member of parliament J. M. Kariuki and laid it at the door of the police. Later he took a leading role in defending churches that had criticized the president's insistence on abandoning the secret ballot and replacing it with the open queuing system.\* Rubia's was the only dissenting voice when parliament passed the bill to eliminate security of tenure in office for the attorney general, controller, and auditor. However, Rubia's tenure as a Nairobi machine politician had tainted him; his reputation for manipulating public finances and offices to the advantage of supporters prevented him from assembling a coherent opposition.

Rubia thus teamed up with the principal leader of the business-based opposition, Kenneth Matiba, a wealthy entrepreneur who had entered politics only in 1979. Matiba was a member of the civil service during the early Kenyatta years but left government in 1968. He joined Kenya Breweries, Ltd., and by 1977 was executive chairman of its parent company, East African Breweries, Inc. He invested his earnings in several private concerns, including hotels. In 1979, Matiba ran for parliament from Mbiri constituency in Muranga district and won. Moi successively appointed him minister for culture and social services, minister for health, and minister for transport and communications. In these capacities he made himself a highly visible public figure, undertaking inspection tours of poorly managed projects and facilities and openly discussing both problems and criteria for measuring improvement. Matiba resigned in protest from the Cabinet in 1988 after members of the Office of the President manipulated party elections in his district in an attempt to remove him from power.

In May 1990, Rubia and Matiba called a joint press conference to announce their support for multiparty competition in Kenya. Their concerns echoed those of propertied citizens of other countries in earlier rebellions. The two attributed Kenya's growing economic problems to KANU's inflexibility and the leadership's refusal to be held publicly accountable. They attacked first the government's inability to curb corrupt practices that harmed business, singling out irregularities in public services such as the Post Office, the Ports Authority, the National Cereals Board, and the General Medical stores. They attacked the "pointless" reorganization of the Coffee Board and the Kenya Tea Development Authority, as well as the destruction of the Kenya Planters' Cooperative Union and the Kenya Farmers' Association. To the extent that the Matiba-Rubia platform was business-related, it drew less from dislike of actual policies than concern about corruption and appointments to public office made not on the basis of merit but closeness to the president.

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\*Editor's note: The system of queue voting was introduced in 1986 as a way to nominate candidates for local and parliamentary elections. KANU members, the only people who could vote, were required to physically line up behind their candidate; a candidate who thus won at least 70 percent of the vote was declared the elected representative.

The government cracked down in July, labeling the bid for democracy a movement under the control of the rival Kikuyu ethnic group. It detained Rubia, Matiba, and other advocates of competitive politics and took measures to curb further dissent. In one of the first demonstrations of broad-based support for political change, however, the "popular classes"—students, urban traders, the poor—poured into the streets of Nairobi to protest these actions by the government. On July 7, Matiba and Rubia were to have sponsored a rally for multiparty democracy in the city; with the leaders in prison, as many as 6,000 people protested in the streets. The towns at the center of the mainly Kikuyu districts of Central province also experienced demonstrations and violence. The riots captured international attention and brought the government's position under scrutiny.

Kenya had also been home to more diffuse types of protest. Mwakenya, a leaderless underground opposition group, had developed during the early 1980s. Operating clandestinely and partly through "oaths," as had the Mau Mau rebels in the 1950s, Mwakenya's membership was never clear. Alleged affiliation with the organization provided a pretext for the arrest of government critics of various ideological stripes, and Mwakenya's membership may thus have appeared larger than it really was. The group's "Draft Minimum" program included demands for social justice—better public transportation, guaranteed medical care, and improved working conditions. Information about the group spread through illegal pamphlets and leaflets that quickly appeared and disappeared on the streets.

With Matiba and Rubia out of the picture and Mwakenya too far underground to organize a solid opposition, leadership of the opposition fell to people who had both a personal stake in political reform—older politicians the government had sidelined, lawyers, and the clergy—and protected lines of communication with other citizens. Older politicians are often most vulnerable to government repression because their livelihoods depend on their jobs as representatives and on the political networks they have built. They are usually the most closely watched by government surveillance as well. The clergy and lawyers have different organizational advantages they can exploit to protect themselves and others. Sermons constitute privileged speech and are less subject to bans than newspapers and leaflets. Moreover, churches often belong to international denominations, whose overseas members may bring unwelcome monitoring of the government if their local representatives are jailed.

The legal profession has similar international ties through the Kenyan section of the International Commission of Jurists and publications such as the *Nairobi Law Monthly* that circulate outside the country. Invoking attorney-client privilege, members of the clergy, politicians, and businesspeople with legal concerns or threatened with legal

action can consult lawyers in private—and pass on information that may aid the opposition. Furthermore, lawyers in Kenya have a direct personal stake in political change; without an independent judiciary, for which multiparty competition is a safeguard, it is difficult to defend a client or prosecute a case. Indeed, the very utility of the legal profession is at stake.

Although some lawyers and members of the clergy preferred the alternative of a more accountable single-party state, others were adamant in their commitment to political competition in Kenya. Some lawyers had long worked behind the scenes for change, but the first formal group demands appeared in 1990, when a group of 54 lawyers urged the loosening of political restrictions. They pointed out that KANU had a membership of 5 million, which left 20 million Kenyans without any political affiliation or input, since only the party could nominate candidates for office, and it was carefully screening them. Legalization of opposition parties was vital, the group of lawyers suggested.

Church involvement in political debate began in 1986 with the objections of some members of the clergy to replacement of the secret ballot with the queuing system in elections. Some church organizations that spoke out, like the National Council of Churches of Kenya, lost members to smaller denominations and sects that usually backed the ruling party. The head of the National Council of Churches set the tone for church-state relations when he said publicly that "debate is a healthy exercise.... If a country cannot debate an issue of national significance, we shall be denying ourselves the very roots of democracy."<sup>1</sup> The Anglican Church of the Province of Kenya and the Presbyterian Church of East Africa played a major role in providing space for discussion of political change.

Although lawyers and the clergy could link people with similar views from different communities and different regions, they still faced disadvantages as organizers. Many landed in detention in the 1980s for their more public statements. The government also sought to intervene in Kenya Law Society elections in order to ensure that the society's leadership did not fall to government opponents. It lashed out at clerics in virulent public attacks and sought to prosecute some in the courts.

If Kenya's interest groups—its civil society—had trouble mounting a successful opposition to the government it was not for lack of talent or motivation. It suffered first from the control exercised by the Moi government, whose surveillance of opposition activity and fragmenting of potential opposition were shrewdly managed. Second, the long absence of multiparty competition ensured that members of parliament were dependent for their survival on the blessings of the Office of the President, which had increasingly intervened in elections for party offices and occasionally in those for parliamentary seats as well. Few spokespeople for reform could be found in the National Assembly, where speech was—theoretically at least—protected. Finally, no single economic sector was sufficiently independent of government contracts, licenses, or financ-

<sup>1</sup>Weekly Review (Nairobi), August 29, 1986, p. 5.



ing that it could organize a strike to halt government operations until demands for improved economic management and regime change were met.

Instead, the opposition loosely organized itself in late 1991, through the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), a coalition of interest groups and political organizations that has had mixed success in instilling discipline and teaching its members the art of compromise. FORD is plagued by internal division, much of it along personal lines. Last December it survived a split between a faction led by former member of parliament Martin Shikuku and a second group, composed mainly of lawyers, which created the National Democratic Alliance under the leadership of Paul Muite and Gitobu Imanyara. Most potential breakaway parties have reached a truce, however, and opposition power remains with FORD.

Nonetheless, the organization lacks clear direction. Although Matiba and Rubia were released from detention, Rubia's reputation as a Nairobi political baron limits his legitimacy as a potential leader in the eyes of many members, and Matiba, severely weakened by a stroke suffered while in jail, is in London. Oginga Odinga, former leader of the Kenya People's Union (KPU), which broke with KANU in 1966 and was banned in 1969, remains the head of FORD.

December 1991 and January 1992 saw not only the rise of FORD but also significant defection from the ruling party. In 1990 a KANU review committee had opened some of the party's proceedings to scrutiny, and limited internal changes in operating practices had been instituted. After the announcement on December 2, 1991, that opposition parties would receive legal recognition if they met registration standards, some high-level KANU politicians expected a shake-up within the party—party elections, at the very least, or significant changes in party structure and goals to enable KANU to compete in multiparty politics. When the president dragged his heels and refused to authorize either of these measures, several Cabinet officials resigned their posts and went into opposition, but not into FORD. Former Vice President Mwai Kibaki formed the Democratic party, the most prominent of several small opposition parties not formally allied with FORD.

## A NEW REALISM OR "NEOCOLONIALISM"?

Despite growing popular support for political reform in Kenya, domestic opposition could not by itself secure regime change. Ultimately, it was international pressure that forced the government's dramatic decision to legalize opposition parties. At a November 1991 meeting in Paris, the United States and 11 other donor countries used millions of dollars in aid and balance of payments support as leverage, giving teeth to the opposition and thereby forcing reform.

Kenya had long been a favored African recipient of multilateral and bilateral assistance. In part this had to do with the country's reputation as one of Africa's "success stories." Kenya's stability and the government's promotion of some foreign investment made it attractive to outsiders. Fur-

thermore, in the cold war world Kenya appeared to be both an ally of the West (and of the Anglo-American coalition in particular) and a possible launching site for a rapid deployment force in the event of an incursion into the Persian Gulf by the Soviet Union or others. Until the late 1980s the United States Navy maintained an access agreement with Kenya permitting refueling and rest and recreation for sailors at the port of Mombasa. Nonetheless, during the 1980s Kenya's strategic role was not important enough for the United States to provide assistance without regard to the regime's behavior. Indeed, throughout the decade, concern about Kenya's long-term prospects for stability under an increasingly repressive government prompted successive American ambassadors to provide limited discretionary funds to public defender groups and others involved in the defense of civil liberties in Kenya.

The collapse of Soviet power, the relative unimportance of Kenya as a base in the Gulf war, and, increasingly, questions about the effective use of foreign aid severely constrained the bargaining power of the Moi government with respect to Western donors. The gradual withdrawal between 1987 and 1991 of the Soviet Union from expensive African engagements left aid providers less inclined to overlook irregularities in the use of their money. And once Kremlin power crumbled, after the August 1991 coup attempt, African governments could no longer play the Soviet card with the United States as they had in the past.

Linkage of aid money to improvements in "governance" or economic management became increasingly explicit. United States Ambassador Smith Hempstone conducted a quite public effort to warn the Moi government that further American assistance would be forthcoming only if the regime demonstrated greater respect for human rights. Hempstone noted that a multiparty system would perhaps improve government accountability. As donors discussed among themselves what they meant by "governance," the rumor spread that legalizing opposition would be a condition for aid.

The Gulf war also affected the bargaining power of governments along Africa's Indian Ocean coast. Some in the American military had long doubted that East African countries could provide adequate emergency sites in case of conflict in the Persian Gulf; nonetheless, the United States and Britain had discussed the matter with Kenya. The events of late 1990 and early 1991 showed that a war in the Persian Gulf could be successfully fought without significant recourse to East African access agreements.

Finally, the need to use aid to support reform in east-central Europe and the countries of the post-Soviet confederation created stronger pressure to compare rates of return on investment. With increasing demands on their limited resources, donor nations had to examine closely how well foreign governments used the funds they were given, and extend support in the future only to those that could demonstrate funds were being employed for their intended usage.

Significant increases in political corruption in Kenya at

precisely the time when the value of the Soviet and Persian Gulf cards was reduced precipitated a six-month suspension of new bilateral and multilateral assistance to Kenya, announced on November 26, 1991. Under the Kenyatta government, members of the president's family as well as the president's associates had personally benefited from their public roles. The amounts of money taken and the numbers of people involved, however, were far greater under the subsequent Moi government. Moi himself claimed considerable "bribes," which helped make him one of the world's richest men, with real estate holdings throughout Europe and Africa.

Throughout the 1980s, Nicholas Biwott, Moi's close friend and Cabinet minister, embezzled tens of millions of dollars from aid contracts, including, apparently, almost all of a \$40-million Swedish allotment. Biwott's associates threatened the lives of foreign bank managers who refused to permit defaults on several million dollars in personal loans to Biwott. After Foreign Minister Robert Ouko protested that such practices would result in the termination of foreign assistance, he was killed, allegedly by Biwott's henchmen and possibly by Biwott himself. Not just politicians but also members of the civil service, including several diplomatic representatives and permanent secretaries, have been caught with their fingers in the till.

Moi has denounced the reformist urgings of foreign governments and multilateral organizations on the grounds that they are nothing more than an extension of "neocolonialism." In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation, Moi remarked, "You are not allowed to think, but you are told: Do what we want you to do. If I make a suggestion, which I know is good for my people, and they say no, you must follow this, you must accept what has been decided all over the world; that is not going to help the people."<sup>2</sup> He argued that pressure for a multiparty state came "because the Western media set against us, because of the economic setting today. The trend of the world economies are being controlled by developed countries."

## HOW THINGS STAND

During the early part of 1992 the future of multiparty competition in Kenya appeared increasingly unclear. The country saw substantially more press freedom than it had in many years. Existing newspapers, such as *The Daily Nation*, began to voice more direct criticism of the government in their pages and broadened their coverage of news, including opposition activities. New newspapers and weeklies sprang up. Citizens spoke with increasing openness about political affairs. Greater freedom of association was allowed. Some, but not all, of the corrupt officials identified by foreign donors were arrested; Biwott was sidelined early, and several permanent secretaries followed. Yet surveillance of opposition members and limitations on

freedom of association continued. The Office of the President has resisted calling elections, and the rules for the registration of opposition political parties have remained unclear.

Indeed, with President Moi's announcement that the government would permit registration of opposition parties, Kenya regained not a multiparty system but the kind of regime in place in the late 1960s under Kenyatta. At that time KANU was less significant as an instrument for exercising social control; nonetheless, the requirement that opposition parties meet certain standards in order to register and then propose candidates for office gave the government a significant tool for keeping challengers out of competition. In 1966 and 1967 the regime used registration rules to prevent the KPU from contesting seats in legislative elections and from assembling a political base; Kenya thus became a de facto single-party system. In sum, Moi's December announcement did not represent a radical departure from single-party rule but merely a return to a set of rules that tolerated single-party dominance.

Second, the government continued to circumscribe potential opposition in various ways. During the early months of this year, numerous attacks against opposition politicians and their supporters were orchestrated by the Office of the President through the party. In late February, KANU supporters stoned FORD chairman Odinga at an organizational meeting. Violence erupted in Nairobi less than a week later when police clubbed supporters of women hunger-strikers calling for the release of political prisoners; the police action provoked additional disturbances throughout the city. And in March, Moi banned all political meetings, citing recent ethnic violence in western Kenya that some opposition members believe the government let go unchecked in order to show that multiparty elections would bring "chaos" to Kenya.

Finally, the long delay in proposing a national convention or a schedule for elections appears calculated to take advantage of rifts likely to develop in the opposition coalition. Whatever the political setting, it is always difficult to learn both the habit of compromise and the routines necessary to construct broad popular constituencies. While an opposition that has had to function underground for two decades reorients itself, disagreements over strategy and style are certain to arise. Within two months of its formation FORD successfully dealt with the problem of fragmentation in its ranks. Whether it will continue to do so remains a question. There is significant dissatisfaction on the part of FORD members with the perceived "authoritarian" manner of some of their colleagues. Unless FORD members acquire the ability to compromise and sacrifice some measure of ideological purity, the opposition will shatter, as it has in most other African countries undergoing similar political change. The consequence would be the maintenance of KANU's dominance amid the creation of somewhat greater space for criticism—space whose existence remains contingent on the willingness of foreign donors to use their leverage for this purpose. ■

<sup>2</sup>British Broadcasting Corporation as quoted in *Africa Events* (London), February 1992, p. 29.

Tensions between the Mugabe government's desire to create a one-party state in Zimbabwe and international pressure to maintain a multiparty system are acute. As Virginia Knight explains, "Dependent on Western governments to help the country out of its current economic straits, the president is bound to maintain democratic structures or he will jeopardize the country's economic lifeline."

# Zimbabwe: The Politics of Economic Reform

BY VIRGINIA CURTIN KNIGHT

In 1981, the government of newly independent Zimbabwe pledged to pursue policies that would provide "rapid economic growth, full employment, price stability, dynamic efficiency in resource allocation and an equitable distribution of the ensuing benefits."<sup>1</sup> In the 11 years since, President Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has failed to bring about any of the promised changes. The standard of living for many Zimbabweans has not improved, and most of the 30 percent of Zimbabweans who live in urban areas have actually seen their living standard deteriorate.

Under economic and social pressure, the government implemented an economic structural adjustment program in 1991 designed by Western lending institutions.\* As in other African countries, the lenders, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, predicated financial assistance on Zimbabwe's adoption of a free-market economy and the maintenance of a democratic political system. In return for freeing the economy from government controls and reducing the budget deficit, foreign donors have pledged to grant or lend Zimbabwe \$700 million in the first phase of a five-year program aimed at helping local industry modernize, expand production, and create jobs.

Because of the power vacuum created by the collapse

of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Western countries can insist that Zimbabwe's government toe the democratic line. Although not stated as explicitly as it was to Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi by Smith Hempstone, the United States ambassador to Kenya, the Western message to Mugabe and Zimbabwe is the same: "No democracy, no money."<sup>2</sup>

## URBAN-RURAL STRAINS

To sustain a society based on democratic principles and still remain in power, the government has to improve the standard of living for all citizens. But the measures implemented under the World Bank-guided structural adjustment program have further strained the resources of urban workers and the rural poor. The government lifted price controls on most commodities and reduced subsidies on bread and other staple goods at about the same time it allowed the Zimbabwe dollar to depreciate approximately 40 percent. Inflation has increased to an annual rate of around 30 percent, while wages have remained static. All but those earning the lowest wages now pay fees on previously free services such as education and health care.

In order to reduce the government's budget deficit, thousands of civil servants and workers in state-owned companies have been fired. This year 9,000 civil servants are scheduled for dismissal; by 1995, 25 percent of the country's 192,000 bureaucrats will have lost their jobs. (Mugabe has also pledged to reduce his bulging 56-member Cabinet of ministers and deputy ministers.)

In rural areas, farmers are suffering from the drought that hit southern Africa earlier this year. Aid programs have been initiated in some regions, and millions of people are expected to require food assistance before next year's harvest. Normally a maize exporter, Zimbabwe imported 150,000 tons of the grain from South Africa to hold it until the harvest starts in May and June. But because of the drought this year, the country's maize harvest is estimated at just 400,000 tons, one-third the amount required for domestic demand and strategic

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\*Editor's note: Structural adjustment programs attempt to restructure the economies of developing countries by reducing the role of the state in the economy and fostering private enterprise. For an analysis, see Carol Lancaster, "Economic Restructuring in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Current History*, May 1989.

<sup>1</sup>*Growth with Equity: An Economic Policy Statement* (Harare: Government Printer, February 1981).

<sup>2</sup>Author's interview with United States Ambassador Smith Hempstone, Nairobi, Kenya, November 1991.



reserves. As a result, Zimbabwe needs to import 2 million tons of maize, along with 300,000 tons of wheat and about 200,000 tons of sugar.

Zimbabwe's economy is still dominated by middle-class whites and the country's political structure by an elitist class of blacks that has ignored the majority of the people. The institutions that in a democratic society normally provide checks against a ruling party—Parliament, the civil service, the press, and the courts—have in Zimbabwe become subservient to the party over the 12 years of ZANU-PF rule. But diffuse dissent and dissatisfaction with the government are found in the townships and densely populated areas of the country. The working class is increasingly disaffected, although no one person or party has yet won its allegiance.

Old nationalist leaders head the major opposition parties, which are not so much parties as personalities with followers. New opposition leaders may come from the ruling circle, as they have in Kenya and several other countries in the throes of a power shift. With the next general election to be held by 1995, time and events may propel a popular leader, either from within ZANU-PF or from outside it, into the limelight and into a contest with Mugabe for the presidency. However, the death of the president's wife in January raises the possibility that the 68-year-old ruler may decide not to stand for reelection again and instead retire to become the country's elder statesman.

## MOVEMENT TOWARD A ONE-PARTY STATE

Western concerns about the Zimbabwean government's commitment to democracy were catalyzed by Mugabe's early pronouncements that Zimbabwe should be a one-party state. While the 1980 constitution drawn up at the Lancaster House peace talks in London guaranteed freedom of association, it also said that the guarantee could be overturned by amendment after 10 years—from 1990 on—by a two-thirds vote of Parliament.

When in 1987, after several years of guerrilla war, the ruling party finally reached an agreement with its opponent, the Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF-ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, Mugabe was assured a two-thirds majority in Parliament. In December 1989 the two leaders formally dissolved their parties and formed ZANU-PF, with Mugabe as head of the united party and the 72-year-old Nkomo a party vice president and one of two state vice presidents.

In general elections held in March 1990, ZANU-PF won 117 of the 120 elective seats in Parliament, considerably more than two-thirds of the total of 150 seats (12 are filled by presidential appointment, and 18 members are elected indirectly as representatives of interest groups). Mugabe took the party's victory at the polls as a mandate to legislate the establishment of a one-party state.

In anticipation of the party's move, people from all

segments of society—churches, labor organizations, the business community, the legal profession, the University of Zimbabwe, even the government-controlled newspaper, *The Herald* of Harare—spoke out against one-party rule. The debate began a few months after the murder of Liberian President Samuel Doe and the fall of Mugabe ally Nicolae Ceausescu, the president of Romania, and the leaders of other single-party, socialist states in Eastern Europe.

When Mugabe asked the ZANU-PF Politburo and Central Committee for their views on a one-party state, he found himself isolated from the prevailing thought. *The Financial Gazette*, an independent weekly based in Harare, reported in August 1990 that the Politburo had voted 21 to 4 against making Zimbabwe a legal one-party state. When the Central Committee also refused to endorse the idea, the August 16 *Gazette* quoted Mugabe as saying, "We have been debating the pros and cons within my party... [W]e have agreed that although we want a one-party system, let's leave things as they are. We are maintaining the status quo but de facto we have a one-party system."

A superficial examination of the results of the 1990 elections seems to support the view that they were a vote of confidence for one-party rule under ZANU-PF. However, candidates for Parliament were elected in individual contests for each seat. Had the seats been distributed according to the proportion of the vote received by each party, the major opposition party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement, would have taken 20 seats instead of 2. Edgar Tekere, ZUM's candidate for president, captured 16 percent of the national vote, to Mugabe's 84 percent. A ZANU-PF breakaway faction, ZANU (Ndonga), led by the exiled Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, won 1 seat in Parliament. This surprise showing by the opposition demonstrated ZANU-PF weakness. In addition, voter turnout was poor because of government intimidation, according to the opposition; of 4.8 million registered voters, only 54 percent voted, as compared with 95 percent turnouts in the 1980 and 1985 elections.

Opposition within the party surfaced in the ZANU-PF primary. In balloting in 22 constituencies, voters nominated candidates other than those handpicked by the party. The party canceled the results and encouraged the unapproved candidates to step down; balloting was held a second and even a third time until the candidate sanctioned by party leaders won. In its most blatant interference in the electoral process, the party annulled results from the first round of voting in the city of Bindura when ZANU-PF Politburo member Joyce Mujuru lost her race for a parliamentary seat. Her opponent was persuaded to withdraw, and Mujuru was unopposed in the second round. When it looked like Vice President Simon Muzenda was going to lose the race for his parliamentary seat in the town of Gweru, election authorities quickly redrew district boundaries to give him the advantage.

Opposition candidates reported political violence and intimidation by government officials and members of the ZANU-PF Youth League and Women's League. In the worst case of election-related violence, Muzenda's opponent, former Gweru Mayor Patrick Kombayi, was shot in the groin and seriously injured by men he identified as belonging to the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO).

## THE WEAK OPPOSITION

Breeding grounds for political opposition were co-opted by the government at independence. At that time, the ruling party brought all social movements under its control, including trade unions and women's and youth groups. The university, cultural groups, and sports associations, among others, were also brought under government jurisdiction. The groups allowed to remain outside the party were white, religious, or professional organizations that took little part in local affairs.

ZANU-PF's control of the government means that opposition parties have a difficult time in Zimbabwe. They have some access to the print media since weeklies and monthlies are privately owned, but very little to state-controlled radio and television. Although the state of emergency inherited from the white Rhodesian government of Ian Smith was lifted in 1990, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act still proscribes political meetings of more than 200 people without police permission; the act has been used mostly to disrupt ZUM meetings.

ZUM ran a credible opposition in the 1990 elections. After the elections, however, it dropped from public view and resurfaced in late 1991 rent with divisions. A faction led by Harare physician Emmanuel Magoche, charging that ZUM lacked democratic principles, broke away last September to form the Democratic party. Most of the Democratic officials are urban-based, upwardly mobile professionals who appeal to a narrow band of the population.

The other political party represented in Parliament is ZANU (Ndonga), led by the 72-year-old Sithole, who returned to Zimbabwe in January 1992 from the United States, where he had been living since 1983. Sithole was secretary general of ZANU from 1963 until he was displaced by Mugabe in 1974. The United African National Council, headed by the Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa, won three parliamentary seats in the 1980 elections but failed to win again in either 1985 or 1990. Muzorewa, who is now 67, was active in the liberation struggle as leader of the African National Council, and also served in the 1978 transition government and as prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in 1979.

The National Progressive Alliance was formed in 1985 in the town of Chinhoyi, near Harare. Led by former ZAPU military commander Candiwell Nziramasanga, the NPA is seeking support from former Rhodesians in South Africa who wish to live in Zimbabwe. The December issue of the Harare magazine *Parade* reported the forma-

tion of an anti-ZANU-PF party in the United States and Britain called the Monomatapa People's Alliance. In letters to academics at the University of Zimbabwe, the MPA claims to have offices in 14 cities in eight countries, including Luanda, Angola, where it will share offices with the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), headed by Jonas Savimbi. The MPA's 13-point program calls for, among other things, free elections, freedom of the press, tax cuts, and the return of \$100 million the group alleges ZANU stole from government funds and transferred outside the country through the Zimbabwean subsidiary of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI).

In February, Egypt Dzinemunhenzva announced the formation of the African National party, which aims to reinvigorate the economy. Dzinemunhenzva claims a nationwide party membership of 12,000. The best financed opposition party is the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe, which is the Rhodesian Front party renamed. CAZ president Gerald Smith, a white commercial farmer, has been supporting ZUM.

Acting independently, these small, underfunded parties will be overwhelmed by the ruling party and its resources. At Sithole's press conference on his return from exile, ZUM's secretary for foreign affairs, Raphael Hamadziripi, said that ZUM would be willing to form a united front with other parties that want to establish democracy and remove Mugabe from power. The difficulty with such an alliance will not be so much ideological differences as personality clashes.

## THE CHALLENGE FROM WITHIN

More formidable opposition may come from within ZANU-PF. With Cabinet and civil service cuts and charges of corruption and mismanagement directed at the inner circle, potential opposition leaders may disassociate themselves from Mugabe's government. Among the most talked-about potential leaders is Minister for Public Service Eddison Zvobgo, who is from heavily populated Masvingo province. Zvobgo is openly critical of party policies on the adoption of socialism and a one-party state, and recently challenged the government-controlled press to act as the "people's policeman at large."

Although about 70 percent of the Zimbabwean people are Shona-speakers, this substantial majority is subdivided into groups speaking different dialects, in which ethnic loyalties and affiliations remain strong. One reason Mugabe has maintained a large Cabinet is to keep the ethnic balance favorable to himself and fellow Zezeru-speakers, who make up about 18 percent of Shonas. Zvobgo is a Karanga-speaker (Karangas account for about 22 percent of Shonas). ZUM leader Tekere is a Manyika-speaker (his group makes up about 13 percent of Shonas).

An alliance between Zvobgo's Karanga faction from the Masvingo region and younger politicians who are members of the Ndebele ethnic group, which accounts

for about 20 percent of Zimbabwe's total population, could mount a strong challenge to the ruling party. Dissatisfaction among Karangas was evident when Vice President Muzenda, the highest-ranking Karanga party official, nearly lost his seat in Gweru in the 1990 elections. Younger Ndebeles are unhappy with the way Nkomo's ZAPU was co-opted by Mugabe; in the southern region of Matabeleland, Nkomo received the fewest votes among former ZAPU members running there.

Despite creation of a government ministry solely for the advancement of the party—the Ministry for Political Affairs—ZANU-PF has failed to gain support at the grassroots level. With an original annual budget of 4 million Zimbabwe dollars (Z\$), the ministry was conceived to help facilitate the merger of ZANU and ZAPU in 1989. With a current annual budget of Z\$50 million, the ministry is to provide administrative and secretarial services to ZANU-PF (It also recently assumed responsibility for women's and youth affairs, managed by the party.)

The allocation of taxpayers' money for purely party functions has raised considerable criticism. Mugabe has defended the ministry by saying, "Our party, ZANU-PF, after the unity, has sacrificed for the nation. Why should the nation now not come to the assistance of the party?"

Not content with establishing government agencies for service to the party, ZANU-PF Secretary for the Commissariat Moven Mahachi raised a political storm in mid-1991 when he said that party members should supervise the work of civil servants. Mahachi, who is also minister of home affairs and as such in charge of the police, argued further that "The party is supreme to government.... The Politburo supervises the Cabinet. The Central Committee supervises Parliament. So the party's provincial executive should also supervise the work of civil servants in their respective areas."

Not all party officials are satisfied with this analysis. Minister for Public Service Zvobgo held a press conference to say that Mahachi was wrong. He reminded government workers that "any civil servant who reports government matters outside the established Public Service procedures and systems to any non-civil servant will be liable to disciplinary action which may lead to dismissal from the civil service."

Mahachi's version, however, appears closer to reality. The civil service in Zimbabwe is autonomous on paper but not in actuality. According to Jonathan Moyo, a lecturer in the department of political and administrative studies at the University of Zimbabwe and an outspoken critic of the government, district administrators are reluctant to make decisions without approval from the Ministry for Political Affairs. Moyo has said that the "situation in most districts and provinces is that civil servants are indeed supervised by ZANU-PF officials, directly and indirectly. It is in this sense that Zimbabwe is becoming a formidable de facto one-party state with all its dangerous consequences."

## IN CONTEMPT OF PARLIAMENT

Many members of Parliament owe their positions to the ruling party, and almost half hold government portfolios. With only three parliamentary members representing opposition parties, dialogue on policy and criticism of ZANU-PF proposals are at a minimum. Some backbenchers are vocal, but they are often shouted down by the party faithful. Because of the overwhelming dominance of ZANU-PF, controversial legislation, such as the University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act, the National Council for Higher Education Act, and the Land Amendment to the constitution, has been approved without parliamentary or public debate. Shortly after passage of the University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act, which gave the government control over the university, the school's vice chancellor, Walter Kamba, resigned, announcing his action at last year's graduation ceremony in Mugabe's presence. "There are too many fingers in the affairs of the university," Kamba said, "non-professional fingers with a wide variety of agenda."

The party also disciplines members of Parliament who speak out against the party line or party members who run as independents against handpicked party candidates. In Manicaland province, party members who ran as independents have been barred for four years from holding any party office. Members of Parliament were reprimanded after they criticized the government for granting members of the government and Parliament wage increases between 9 and 11 percent at a time when people were being told to "tighten their belts" because of the structural adjustment program.

Criticism from outside Parliament is barely tolerated. The speaker of the House of Assembly, Nolan Makombe, warned private citizens who had been critical of the way the University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act and the National Council for Higher Education Act were passed that they should be careful in their apportionment of blame on matters relating to Parliament. Careless use of the word "Parliament," he said, could constitute contempt of Parliament. In a New Year's Eve press conference, Makombe said that university lecturer Moyo's published criticism of his position was being reviewed by legal counsel to see if Moyo was indeed in contempt of Parliament.

Government spokesmen bully and bluster in their attempts to intimidate the local and foreign press, but the government has not gone beyond legal limits. When Mugabe commissioned a new printing press for ZANU-PF's publisher, he accused "certain organizations and individuals outside of our country, using willing tools among us, of orchestrating a propaganda war." He told party supporters that the ruling party had to mount its own campaign to explain the true situation to the people.

The paradox of Zimbabwean politics is that as the government and the party become more repressive in order to dampen protest over the dismal state of the economy, the private press has multiplied and become



more critical. However, freedom of expression continues to be a foreign concept for the government. Minister of Information, Posts, and Telecommunications Victoria Chitepo has told local journalists that "our people would do better to discard the myth of an 'independent' and 'free' press because no such thing exists in the world."

Probably the most widely read news magazine in Zimbabwe is *Parade*. Last year the editor had a falling out with the publisher and founded a new publication called *Horizon*. Both monthlies run stories on high-level corruption in the police, human rights violations, terror tactics by members of the CIO, and exposés of Cabinet ministers who have acquired large farms and estates.

*Moto*, a monthly sponsored by the Roman Catholic Church, has been an outspoken critic of government policy since independence. *The Financial Gazette*, which was purchased by black Zimbabweans in 1989, carries articles critical of the government, especially ones written by people affiliated with the University of Zimbabwe. *The Inside*, a 12-page monthly specializing in investigative reporting published in the city of Bulawayo, began appearing in early 1991.

Zimbabwe's newest publication is the weekly *The Sunday Times*. This was originally published by a consortium of six major shareholders representing private business, among them Herbert Mnangatire, a director of the multinational Lonrho Zimbabwe; the prominent nationalists James Chikerema and George Nyandoro, founders in 1955 of the City Youth League; Ariston Chambati, chief executive of TA Holdings, the largest locally owned conglomerate in the country; and businessman and historian Lawrence Vambe. Vambe said the newspaper would "be guided by the national interests as we judge them to be"; Deputy Minister of Information Chen Chimutengwende warned him in August 1991 that the government would not be "favourably disposed to a paper which degenerated into a mouthpiece for fifth columnists." In February 1992 publishers of *The Financial Gazette* took over *The Sunday Times*.

Zimbabwean television consists of two channels controlled by the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, a state-owned company. Minister of Information Chitepo became embroiled in another controversy when she directed the ZBC board to appoint Christopher Mutsvangwa acting deputy director general of the corporation. The board objected to its loss of independence and delayed the appointment, but eventually approved it. Chitepo said that "it is necessary for the minister to be involved. There is no parastatal that is not guided." Mutsvangwa is a former diplomat who holds a master's degree in public administration; he is also a former member of the CIO. One of his two partners in the media firm is Lieutenant General Tapfumaneyi Mujuru, a commander of the Zimbabwe National Army.

The courts remain a relatively independent voice in the political structure, but even they have lost in scuffles with the executive. The heaviest blow to the courts' prestige was delivered during the Sandura Commission hearings on automobile racketeering by members of the Cabinet in 1989. The Supreme Court found former Minister of State for Political Affairs Frederick Shava guilty of perjury and sentenced him to nine months in prison. Mugabe pardoned Shava, undermining the court's authority. In light of the pardon, perjury charges against the other members of the Cabinet were dropped. One judge, who asked to remain unidentified, commented, "There is really no point in expecting members of the public to respect the judiciary when judges do not get respect from their own employers."<sup>3</sup>

In August 1990, Mugabe appointed Anthony Gubbay chief justice of the Supreme Court, replacing retiring Justice Enoch Dumbutshena. Gubbay clashed with the executive branch the following January when he told senior ministers that amendments to the constitution passed by the House of Assembly in December 1990 concerning the flogging of minors, reinstatement of the death penalty, and land acquisition were, in his opinion, unconstitutional.

The Land Amendment allows the government to confiscate land from farmers and pay them an amount determined by the government; the landowner cannot challenge the fairness of the compensation in court. Mugabe responded to Gubbay's opinion that this denial of access to the courts was unconstitutional by saying, "I can't be dragged to court; I, Robert Mugabe, with ancestral generations far back, I be dragged to court by a settler who came only 90 years ago. Who will claim that the land we are taking is his?"

The Cabinet approved the implementing legislation, which was submitted to Parliament in January 1992. The Court must await a challenge to the amendment or the bill before it can hand down a ruling. Gubbay's position is that a "constitution stands on certain fundamental principles which are its structural pillars, and if these were ever damaged the constitutional edifice will fall."

## NO DEMOCRACY, NO MONEY, NO MUGABE?

Zimbabwe's multiparty political system has benefited from the government's reliance on outside economic assistance. Mugabe is unequivocal in his desire for a legalized one-party state, but does not have his own party's support for the idea. Dependent on Western governments to help the country out of its current economic straits, the president is bound to maintain democratic structures or he will jeopardize the country's economic lifeline. If the structural adjustment program brings about some improvement in the people's standard of living, ZANU-PF may well score a victory in the 1995 elections. But if the adjustment program fails, the government will surely fall. ■

<sup>3</sup>*The Herald* (Harare), August 17, 1990.

The Sahelian countries in West Africa have been plagued by ethnic turmoil and military governments. But the growing trend toward democracy in Africa seems to have begun to gain ground in this volatile and ecologically scarred region.

## Finding Peace through Democracy in Sahelian Africa

BY RICHARD L. SKLAR AND MARK STREGE

Africa today is tormented by the scourge of war. At the beginning of 1991, 15 African wars took their daily toll of casualties.<sup>1</sup> These included civil wars in Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa; clan and factional warfare in Somalia; an invasion of armed exiles into Rwanda; ethnic insurrections in northern Uganda; revolts by the Tuareg people in Mali and Niger; an insurrection by separatists in the Casamance region of Senegal; armed resistance to government-sanctioned violence against the non-Moorish, African minority in Mauritania; and the war in Western Sahara, where the Sahrawi are fighting for the region's independence from Morocco. All these conflicts were basically internal wars, yet their crossboundary ramifications embittered relations between neighboring states. In the somber view of Jacques Delors, president of the Commission of the European Community, Africa was on the verge of becoming "a zone of fundamental instability."<sup>2</sup>

While recent, current, and impending warfare in Africa underscores Delors's dire forecast, some conflicts

on the continent have been resolved, and the manner in which they were concluded offers pathways to end ongoing disputes. No fewer than eight major military conflicts have ended since the Burkina Faso–Mali war of December 1985. They include the intermittent war between Chad and Libya, which appears to have ended in 1987; the western Zimbabwe insurrection, at its peak during the early 1980s and finally resolved through political negotiations in 1987; South Africa's attempts to destabilize Angola between 1975 and 1989; the Namibian war of independence from South Africa, concluded in 1989; the African National Congress's armed struggle against South Africa, which was suspended by the ANC in 1991 as part of a process designed to result in a non-racial democracy; a 30-year civil war in Ethiopia, which concluded with the fall of Addis Ababa in 1991 and led to negotiations for the resolution of sundry disputes; a 16-year civil war in Angola, ended in 1991 as a result of negotiations sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union as well as Portugal; the Liberian civil war of 1989–1991, which resulted in military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and subsequent, albeit as yet inconclusive, political negotiations.

During 1991, several smoldering wars in the Sahelian region of West Africa appear to have been mitigated by conciliatory attitudes arising from a regional—and continental—movement for political democracy. In Mali and Niger, increased political freedom, representative national conferences, and transitional governments with democratic objectives have reduced the intensity of domestic conflicts. In Mauritania, political reforms, including multiparty elections in January 1992, may help reduce crossborder violence in the Senegal River Valley. However, in Chad, ethnic and factional violence continues to complicate a proclaimed transition to democracy.

The simultaneous mitigation of these low-intensity conflicts provides an opportunity to assess compara-

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<sup>1</sup>For a concise summary, see Raymond W. Copson, "Peace in Africa? The Influence of Regional and International Change," in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, eds., *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 22–24.

<sup>2</sup>Quoted in *Le Monde* by Jacques de Barrin, "Africa—A Zone of Fundamental Instability?" *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, November 18, 1990, p. 16.

tively the relationship between democratization and international conflict resolution in a single region. It has often been remarked that, in modern times, democracies have hardly ever waged wars against one another. Yet this obvious relationship between democracy and peace appears to have been discounted and largely overlooked by students of African international relations.

A causal relationship between democracy and peace in Africa was nearly acknowledged in the report of a 1990 Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa, organized by the African Leadership Forum in collaboration with the secretariats of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. While the conferees specified the existence of a "link between development and democracy," they did not identify a similar link between democracy and peace.<sup>3</sup> The discussion that follows examines the presumptive relationship between democratization and the collective security of the states in Sahelian Africa.

### THE TUAREG INSURRECTION IN MALI AND NIGER

The Tuareg, a Berber people who number between 1 million and 1.5 million, inhabit the northern regions of Mali and Niger. Their main urban settlement in Mali is in the city of Timbuktu, which was founded by Tuaregs in the twelfth century; in Niger their historic capital is Agadez. French colonial rule terminated an era of predation by the "blue men," so named for the Tuaregs' flowing indigo robes. By the time of Niger's and Mali's independence in 1960, the Tuareg were a relatively small minority of less than 10 percent in countries governed by those who had once been their victims. The sins of their forebears were visited on present-day Tuaregs in 1964, when a Tuareg rebellion was brutally subdued by the Malian armed forces.

During the 1980s, periodic episodes of drought and famine led to an exodus of Tuaregs from Mali to Algeria, Libya, and other neighboring countries. Many of those who have since voluntarily returned or have been expelled as illegal immigrants live miserably in refugee camps in both Niger and Mali. Protests against alleged maltreatment in those camps set the stage for armed attacks against government installations in both countries during 1990. One group of Tuareg dissidents plotted to overthrow the one-party regime of General Moussa Traoré; others have been secessionist. The counterinsurgency methods of the Malian army have been

condemned for their brutality by Amnesty International and France's Socialist party. In turn, Traoré's regime alleges that the rebels are Libyan proxies and that many of them belong to the Libyan Islamic Legion. To be sure, many able-bodied Sahelian émigrés have soldiered for Libya, as they have for Iraq and the Afghan resistance. And the flames of Tuareg separatism are fanned by a belief that the French promised to create an independent Tuareg state in return for Tuareg participation in the French force fighting in colonial Indochina.

In 1990, a United Nations Development Program report found that Niger and Mali were the two most deprived countries in the world. The report based this assessment on a new "human development index," which reflects "life expectancy, literacy and command over the resources to enjoy a decent standard of living." Neither country has experienced effective economic management; at the same time, the two have faced recurrent drought and relentless ecological deterioration.<sup>4</sup> In March 1991, after 23 years in power, the unpopular Traoré regime was toppled by the Malian army. Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, advised by representative civilians, began a political reform process designed to result in the establishment of a constitutional democracy. Although elections were to be held in January 1992 but then were postponed until April, partly because of unrest in the Tuareg regions, few observers doubt that a transition to civilian government will occur soon. Significantly, the interim government includes two traditional Tuareg leaders, who represent the insurrectionist Azaouad Popular Movement and the separatist Azaouad Islamic Arab Front.

In Niger, a national conference convened at the end of July 1991 promptly proclaimed its sovereign authority. Chaired by Professor André Salifou, dean of the faculty of education at Niamey University, the conference was attended by delegates from the Federation of Labor Unions, the Teachers' Union, the government itself, 24 registered political parties, and 69 other associations. In November the conference installed an interim government pending democratic elections after a 15-month transition period. Meanwhile, President Ali Saibou has resigned as president of the former ruling party, the National Movement for a Developing Society, which has been shorn of its special status. The president's own powers as head of state also have been sharply curtailed.

Democratic reforms in Niger and Mali could provide an attractive alternative to warfare for the Tuareg people. Despite the troubled history of African-Berber relations, there are also many ties that bind. Like the Kurds, a Muslim people divided among several states in western Asia, the Sahelian Tuaregs could realize freedom for themselves as a transnational people if democratic governments were established in those sovereign states that contain their principal homelands.

Both Mali and Niger have said Libya is the principal supporter of Tuareg separatism. Although Tuareg sources

<sup>3</sup>Report of a Brainstorming Meeting for a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa," Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, November 17-18, 1990, pp. 7-8.

<sup>4</sup>On Niger, see Robert B. Charlick, *Niger: Personal Rule and Survival in the Sahel* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991). On Mali, see Joseph Roger de Benoist, *Le Mali* (Paris: Harmattan, 1989), and Pascal J. Imperato, *Mali: A Search for Direction* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1989).



try to minimize the extent of Libyan involvement, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's role as champion of the Tuaregs is unmistakable. If the insurrections continue, Libya may be expected to provide sanctuary for Tuareg noncombatants, just as Algeria has provided sanctuary for both the Western Sahara independence movement and embattled Tuareg combatants and refugees in the past.

Neither Mali nor Niger is able to resolve its Tuareg problem unilaterally or in concert with the other at present. In September 1990 the governments of those two countries along with Algeria and Libya established an "interministerial committee" on the Tuareg question. Subsequently, in January 1991, bilateral negotiations between the Malian government and Tuareg rebels were held in Tamanrasset, Algeria. The government agreed to withdraw troops from Tuareg areas in northern Mali, to devolve federal-type powers to the largely Tuareg regions of Gao and Timbuktu, and to allocate a substantial portion of the national budget to develop those regions for the next six years. In return, the rebels agreed to a ceasefire. Assassinations, banditry, and summary executions have since marred the implementation of these accords.

Since the Tuareg people inhabit several adjacent areas in Mali, Niger, Algeria, Libya, and Burkina Faso, the problems of displacement, rebellion, and resettlement are clearly regional in scope. Three regional international organizations may be able to cope with the various issues relating to the Tuaregs more readily than individual states. The three groups are the Agreement on Nonaggression and Defense (ANAD), which includes Mali and Niger as well as Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, and Togo; the 16-member ECOWAS; and the newly formed Arab Maghreb Union, consisting of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Although ANAD was used effectively to settle the Burkina Faso-Mali conflict of 1985, its functions are strictly political and initiated by heads of state, none of whom represent Tuareg interests. In contrast, ECOWAS is primarily an economic organization and can address a major aspect of the Tuareg problem—nomadic pastoralism as an economic activity and a way of life. Free passage across national boundaries, a necessary part of any political settlement that might satisfy the Tuaregs, implies at least some kind of free-trade zone. The current activities of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia show that its political potential is far greater than had been previously believed. Moreover, ECOWAS can enlist Nigeria as a guarantor of any agreements reached. The Arab Maghreb Union, whose goals include the creation of a fiscal union and the economic

integration of its member-states, offers a way to contain Qaddafi's ambitions by harmonizing Libyan policies with those of its neighbors. ECOWAS and the Arab Maghreb Union could conceivably resolve the Tuareg problem.

## STORM OVER MAURITANIA

Mauritania is a sparsely populated country of some 2 million people that has been impoverished by desertification and endemic ethnic conflicts.<sup>5</sup> The Moors, a people of mixed Arab-Berber descent, constitute two-thirds of the population. They are divided into two main groups: the Beydanes and the Haratines. The Haratines were originally slaves of the Beydanes. Although slavery has been abolished formally on three occasions in Mauritanian history, most recently by legislative action in 1980, Africa Watch, a human rights group, alleges that in 1990 there were at least 100,000 slaves in the country.<sup>6</sup> The remaining one-third of the population consists largely of small ethnic groups who live mainly in the south.

Near the end of his 18 years in power, Mauritania's first president, Moktar Ould Daddah, struggled with the burning question of Spanish Western Sahara. In 1975, he agreed to divide the former colony with a potentially menacing neighbor, Morocco, in order to create a land buffer between that powerful kingdom and Mauritania's northern-based mineral industry. However, the Mauritanian armed forces were unable to protect the mining operations against attacks by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario), the guerrilla group fighting for the territory's independence, nor were they able to secure territory claimed by the Polisario as its own. Rising military expenses coupled with economic decline as a result of recurrent droughts and a dispirited army resulted in a 1978 coup and the eventual assumption of power by a pro-Polisario, or "Algerian," faction of the army that then renounced Mauritania's claim to Western Sahara.

In 1984, after another military coup, Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya became president of Mauritania. Taya sought to maintain good relations with both Morocco and the Polisario-Algerian alliance. But the consensual basis of his regime was shattered in 1987 when the government alleged it had thwarted a coup attempt by officers from the southern Toucouleur and Soninke ethnic groups. Tensions increased to the point of rupture along the country's main cultural dividing line that ranges the Moor majority against the non-Moorish minority. While the minority, like the majority, is Muslim, it firmly rejects the policy of cultural and linguistic Arabization that Taya's regime has aggressively pursued.

Taya's ruling Military Committee for National Salvation consists of two principal political factions: the dominant Nasserites, or Qaddafists, who tend to support the Polisario-Algerian alliance; and the minority Baathists, who adhere to the pan-Arabist Iraqi movement and were pro-Moroccan until relations between Iraq and Morocco

<sup>5</sup>For general background, see Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Western Saharans* (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1980).

<sup>6</sup>*Africa News*, July 23, 1990, p. 16.

deteriorated in 1990–1991 during the Persian Gulf crisis. However, the main thrust of Mauritanian Baathist strategy has been Arabization at the expense of the non-Moorish minority, which is made up of people who have grand imperial traditions of their own and resent the imposition of cultural hegemony by the Moorish state. Furthermore, the Moors adhere mainly to the Islamic Qadiriyya brotherhood, while most of the southerners are adherents of the rival Tijaniyya brotherhood.

In 1989, conflicts over grazing land (a result of relentless desertification) involving villagers in the Senegal River Valley ignited the tinder of ethnic tensions in the capitals of both Mauritania and Senegal. When angry mobs looted the shops of Mauritanian merchants in Dakar in Senegal, Senegalese and other non-Moors were killed in Nouakchott. In all, hundreds of people died and more than 1,000 injured in reciprocal spasms of urban violence. According to one report, "During the ensuing months an estimated 170,000 Mauritians fled Senegal while Mauritania reportedly expelled 70,000 Senegalese and 40,000 other nationals (the expulsion of the latter group underlining the schism between Arab and Black Mauritania)."<sup>7</sup> Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed, and "a brief, but bloody exchange of artillery fire" was reported in January 1990.<sup>8</sup> Subsequently, attacks by an African guerrilla organization, the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania, have provoked reprisals in Mauritania.<sup>9</sup>

Meanwhile, Moors have occupied land and villages abandoned by non-Moors in the valley. Mauritania has also demanded \$1 billion from Senegal as compensation for economic losses and has alleged Senegalese government complicity in a coup plot against the Taya government. In turn, Senegal has threatened to assert a land claim north of the Senegal River, and has also alleged that arms have been sent from Mauritania to separatist rebels in the Casamance region of Senegal.

This latter complaint indicates that particular Arab-"African" alliances complicate the picture of an Arab-"African" racial conflict in the region. The most significant transcultural tandem is the firm alliance between Senegal and Morocco. Before the Persian Gulf war in early 1991, Morocco's monarch, King Hassan II, was disturbed by the growth of Iraqi influence in Mauritania, which funneled weapons from Iraq to Polisario guerrillas.<sup>10</sup> Pro-Iraqi Baathists in Mauritania are foremost in both the Arabization campaign and the organization of violence against non-Moors. It was not

surprising that Senegal, like Morocco, contributed a contingent of troops to the United Nations (UN) coalition that forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait during the war.

Soon after the UN victory in the Gulf, Taya announced a political reform program, including constitutional changes and multiparty competition. However, opponents of the regime denounced this maneuver as a subterfuge designed to consolidate the ruling group's power, and they disputed official reports of overwhelming approval of the new constitution in a later referendum. The opposition demands included the installation of an interim government pending the convocation of a sovereign national conference—a process similar to the one carried out in Niger. Taya's subsequent election as president, in January 1992, was sharply disputed by the legal opposition, which includes the leadership of Mauritania's sole labor union as well as dissident Haratines. However, non-Moorish voices of dissent have been silenced or driven into revolutionary channels by severe repression. Amnesty International has reported that as many as 339 political prisoners may have died, many of them under torture, in military or police custody between November 1990 and March 1991.<sup>11</sup> Meanwhile, the army continues to enforce an undeclared policy of expelling non-Moors, who live in the valley, from their homes.

Despite the turn toward reform, Taya's regime appears to contemplate prolonged managed conflict with Senegal rather than a genuine settlement of critical disputes. Expulsion of the non-Moors from southern Mauritania, often on the dubious ground that they are not citizens, is a demagogic technique that diverts attention from pressing economic problems. Indeed, the problems caused by ecological deterioration and political disruption have been compounded by the loss of revenues that had been remitted by the prosperous Mauritanian merchant community in Senegal, as well as the loss of foreign aid previously given by Arab opponents of Iraq. Historically, the Moors have disdained farming in favor of pastoralism. Hence a general exodus of southerners would wreak havoc in the agricultural sector.

Northern elites have exploited the issue of cultural differences between Moors and non-Moors since it allows them to contain a potentially divisive tension between the black and white sections of the Moorish community. The policy of Arabization, in particular, is designed to bind the Haratines to the Beydanes, who are aware of their exclusively Arab and Berber heritages. Left to themselves, the so-called white Moors would be vulnerable to Arab versus Berber conflicts and conflicts between clans. For all these reasons, the Nouakchott regime would not want to create a purely Moorish nation. Instead, its policy is to marginalize non-Moors within a multicultural political system. The fearful implication of this practice is continued internal warfare with potentially dangerous external consequences.

<sup>7</sup>Arthur S. Banks, ed., *Political Handbook of the World: 1990* (Binghamton, N.Y.: CSA Publications, 1990), p. 413.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>*West Africa* (London), December 17–23, 1990, p. 3065.

<sup>10</sup>*Africa Confidential* (London), August 24, September 22, and October 12, 1990.

<sup>11</sup>Amnesty International (London), Amnesty International Index: AFR 38/07/91.

## CHAD: A STATE OF WAR

In Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, particular ethnic groups (Moors, Bambara, and Hausa respectively) are large enough to dominate the country's political life. In the vast expanse of Chad, with its total population of nearly 5 million, only one group, the Christian-influenced Sara of the southern part of the country, numbers more than 1 million people. Outside the relatively fertile south, there are two other centers of political gravity. First, in northern Chad, the Toubou, adherents of the Islamic Sanusiyya brotherhood, overshadow a more numerous group of nomadic Arab clans that have not exercised political influence. Second, in eastern Chad, Islamic peoples such as the Hajeray and Zaghawa are culturally oriented toward western Sudan.

Chad has been torn by war ever since Qaddafi's regime in Libya extended support to northern insurgents against the southern-based government of President François Tombalbaye in 1971. Tombalbaye's assassination in a 1975 coup ushered in a period of instability that lasted until 1982, when Hissène Habré, a northerner yet a sworn enemy of Qaddafi, seized control of the Chadian government and summoned French military assistance to counteract Libyan intervention. Habré's consolidation of power culminated in the expulsion of Libyan forces from northern Chad in 1987.<sup>12</sup>

Habré's regime was based mainly on collaboration between three highly politicized ethnic groups: Habré's own Gorane faction of the northern Toubou plus two eastern groups, the Hajeray and the Zaghawa. A Hajeray defection in 1984 reduced the number of groups to two. In 1989, the Zaghawas, sensing an erosion of their power, withdrew support from Habré and organized an insurgent armed force, with Libyan backing, in western Sudan. Habré tried to negotiate a settlement with Qaddafi at a "summit" attended by the leaders of Algeria, Gabon, Libya, Mali, and Nigeria in the Malian capital of Bamako in July 1989. Shortly thereafter, Chad and Libya agreed to submit a territorial dispute over the mineral-rich Aozou Strip in northern Chad to the International Court of Justice for arbitration. Habré continued to authorize the military training of Libyan dissidents in Chad, financed by Saudi Arabia and conducted by teams of American and Israeli instructors, while Libya continued to supply anti-Habré force in Sudan.

In November 1990 the insurgent army, led by Colonel Idriss Déby, a well-regarded military commander, crossed

into Chad, defeated the Chadian national army (forcing Habré into exile), and seized control of the government. Habré's fall was, at first, widely perceived to be a setback for the United States, which supported his seizure of power in 1982 as a stroke against Libya. However, after France, Habré's principal source of financial and military aid at the time of his fall was Iraq. Libya and Iraq are rivals in Chad, where Déby's assumption of the presidency marked a setback for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. (In Sudan the two countries continue to compete for favor with the military government of Brigadier General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir.)

Initially, Déby's regime, based mainly on eastern elements—specifically his own Zaghawa ethnic group and the neighboring Hajeray—was unstable and liable to come apart.<sup>13</sup> In the past, Chadian regimes based on coalitions of rival claimants to power have been notoriously unstable; Déby's own coalition has already been strained by Hajeray-Zaghawa conflicts as well as struggles among Zaghawas themselves. Then, in January 1992, supporters of former President Habré crossed the border from Nigeria into western Chad; more than 100 people were killed before they were driven back.

Despite recurrent rebellions and incursions, the fragmented polity of Chad may yet facilitate democratic reform, since this would prevent the monopolization of power by any one political bloc. Although Déby is himself a product of Chadian warlordism, he appears to have renounced that legacy by calling for a 30-month transition to a democratic government. A commission, representing diverse political views as well as the organized labor movement, has been asked to frame a legal code for the regulation of political parties. Déby has also pledged to convene a national conference, with sovereign authority, to draft a constitution no later than May 1992. Meanwhile, he is attempting to consolidate numerous independent military factions into a single national army. His two-track policy of democratization with discipline has generated new hope for the future of this deeply divided country.

## REINFORCING THE EFFECTS OF FREEDOM

In each of the four conflicts examined, an internal war, either ongoing or recently suspended, threatens to precipitate international warfare. The currently stilled border war between Mauritania and Senegal could restart at any time. In Senegal, Mali, and Niger the government views outbursts of civil strife in Mauritania with grave concern. The Berber Tuaregs of Mali and Niger are ethnic cousins of the Arab/Berber Moors and could be incited to violence by the racial and cultural conflict in Mauritania. Mali, in particular, is endangered by the potential transborder effects of that conflict. It would be logical to consider Mauritania's security problems in conjunction with those of Mali and Niger in multinational initiatives for peaceful solutions.

Similarly, the interminable wars in Chad are unlikely to be concluded until the regional sovereigns, including all

<sup>12</sup>For succinct, incisive accounts of Chadian politics and international relations, see René Lemarchand, "The Crisis in Chad," in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, eds., *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 239–256; and William J. Foltz, "Chad's Third Republic: Strengths, Problems, and Prospects," *CSIS Africa Notes*, no. 77 (October 30, 1987).

<sup>13</sup>Hugo Sada, "Les grandes manœuvres d'Idriss Déby," *Jeune Afrique* (Paris), November 28–December 4, 1990, pp. 24–25.



six states with which Chad shares a border, agree to a collective security arrangement. Without exception, the principal rivals for power in Chad have been utterly dependent on foreign patrons. Chad differs from the other Sahelian countries in its extreme degree of political fragmentation and the amorphous character of the Chadian state. An escape from the ravages of warlordism in Chad may come through the development of representative government based on multiparty democratic elections. Democratization may also help resolve the recurrent internal wars of Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, which are far more cohesive nation-states than Chad. In every case, the advance of democracy would facilitate the resolution of disputes and the maintenance of peace in a society where insecurity has been rife.

It should not be assumed that African countries will deviate from the rule of thumb that modern democracies rarely if ever wage wars against one another. That proposition can be tested by looking at the transborder relationships of democratizing countries in the Sahel, such as the formerly troubled borderlands of Mali, and either Algeria or Burkina Faso. It could also be tested by examining the relationship between Mauritania and either Mali or Senegal, provided the process of proclaimed democratization in Mauritania becomes more genuine than it has thus far appeared to be.

The democratization process in Mauritania could be driven off course by the winds of war in neighboring Western Sahara. Both Morocco and its antagonist, the Polisario Front, expect to win a showdown referendum, previously scheduled to be held under UN auspices in January 1992, but postponed pending the resolution of procedural questions and a dispute over who should be eligible to vote. (Morocco contends that its own citizens who are "born of a Saharan father" should be registered.) The choice before voters will be either independence for a Sahrawi republic or integration into Morocco. If a free and fair vote can be held, and if a credible result is obtained and accepted by the losing side, then Mauritania's own evolution toward democracy would be strongly promoted. Conversely, a state of war in sparsely settled Western Sahara would strengthen the hand of Mauritanian militarists who sympathize with their Hassaniyyan-speaking compatriots of the Polisario. Similarly, reconciliation through democracy in Chad or Niger could be undermined by threats to their security by Libya and Sudan, whose regimes are not accountable to the inhabitants of the two countries.

These observations indicate that it would be difficult to test the hypothesis of a causal relationship between democracy and peace in the Sahelian region. Governments that

have chosen the path of democratic reform are vulnerable to intervention from neighboring dictatorial states. Moreover, the probability that a few dictatorships will continue in this part of Africa implies that diplomatic initiatives and other precautions are required to minimize threats.

At present, peacekeeping services, including conciliation and mediation, are provided in the Sahel by several intergovernmental organizations. They include the OAU, the Arab League, the Arab Maghreb Union, ANAD, ECOWAS, and special purpose groups, such as the "inter-ministerial committee" on Tuareg issues. There is no apparent need for new intergovernmental organizations to secure peace among the Sahelian nations. However, the potential contribution of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the cause of peace in this region has not yet been explored.

While the African Leadership Forum, itself an illustrious NGO, has recognized the important role of NGOs in relation to development problems, it has overlooked the potential utility of such bodies in resolving international conflicts.<sup>14</sup> Yet NGOs have attempted to mediate armed conflicts in Africa in the past. Most have been identified with religious groups and the results of their efforts, which have been recently summarized by David R. Smock, are mixed.<sup>15</sup>

The World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of Churches jointly served as principal mediator in the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement on Sudan. Leading Mozambican clerics along with the Santo Egidio Community in Italy are playing central mediation roles in the negotiations between the Mozambican government and the Mozambican National Resistance (also known as Renamo). Smock also draws attention to the unsuccessful, yet constructive, attempts by former United States President Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center at Emory University during 1989 to mediate both the Ethiopian and the Sudanese conflicts.

A few institutions comparable to the Carter Center, designed to study political and social problems, such as the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, already exist in Africa. Many more similar institutions are needed to critically examine the issues of war and peace. Their functions could encompass crisis prevention as well as mediation. Independent study centers could issue early warnings of potentially dangerous conflicts by means of objective analyses and scholarly communications. Respected NGOs could convene meetings, attended by diplomats, political actors, publicists, scholars, and others who could make positive contributions, to consider questions such as conflict resolution for disputes that have resulted in violence; existing or impending threats to the maintenance of peace between nation-states; and chronic causes of war, which require complex analyses and prescient remedies. The arrival of Africa's own peace movement may soon be at hand. Its emergence in war-torn countries and regions would be the logical consequence of increasing political freedom and allowing greater democracy. ■

<sup>14</sup>Report of a Brainstorming Meeting," op. cit.

<sup>15</sup>David R. Smock, "Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Mediation of Africa's Wars" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 30, 1991), p. 19.

With the end of the cold war, Somalia has become one of the world's bloodiest ethnic battlegrounds. While foreign inattention is slowly dissipating, a concerted effort is required to end the fighting that has made the country "a stark international symbol of human misery."

## Somalia: At War with Itself

BY RAKIYA OMAAR

Nineteen ninety-one is the year Somalia died. Since full-scale civil war broke out on November 17, at least 14,000 people have been killed and 27,000 wounded in the capital city of Mogadishu. Most of the casualties are civilians. Rivalry between the forces of two ruthless men—interim President Mohammed Ali Mahdi and General Mohammed Farrah Aidid, both of whom belong to the same clan and the same movement, the United Somali Congress (USC)—has made Mogadishu an exceptionally dangerous place. In addition to troops loyal to both men, hundreds of armed "freelance" soldiers and looters contribute to the violence.

The large number of casualties can be explained by several factors: the war is taking place in an urban setting; there are about 30,000 armed men and youths in and around Mogadishu, with easy access to a huge arsenal that includes weapons intended for field combat and air attacks; and many of those armed are completely untrained in the use of these weapons.

Lack of adequate medical care is another reason for the numerous casualties. Both factions have been extraordinarily callous, attacking hospitals and periodically interfering with the work of doctors, nurses, and aides. Hospitals do not have minimal nursing support, suffer shortages of medical supplies, and are swollen to three times their capacity. The lack of medical facilities has left many of those wounded who might have survived in a hospital to die in their homes or on the streets.

In the next few months, the already staggering number of casualties will be dwarfed by the tens of thousands of people, especially children, who are likely to die from malnutrition and disease. After the rains begin in late

April, international relief agencies expect outbreaks of particularly virulent forms of meningitis and infectious hepatitis, as well as cholera.

Mogadishu and south-central Somalia also face the worst famine in the country's history. Drought has played only a minor role in this crisis. The famine, which has already begun, is largely man-made, the result of warfare during the past two years. Along the lower Jubba River, cultivation was disrupted in mid-1991 by battles between the USC and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). Crops, seeds, tractors, and irrigation pumps were stolen, villages destroyed, and people displaced. Farmers planted smaller areas, and often consumed their crops before they ripened, both to preempt looters and out of sheer hunger. In March 1992, the International Committee of the Red Cross said that "horrific levels of 90 percent moderate and severe malnutrition" had been found in the area surrounding Belet Huen in central Somalia and in the camps of displaced people around Merca, south of Mogadishu. It estimates that 1.5 million people in and around Mogadishu may be affected by famine, and puts at 4.5 million the number throughout the country who are threatened by starvation.

### DEMOCRACY SIDELINED

The Western media has portrayed the war in Somalia as a clan conflict, ignoring the complex reality that it is also an intense power struggle between two ambitious men and a struggle for basic resources, including food, by groups of impoverished but heavily armed men and boys.

The savagery of the fighting points up the absence of civilian institutions to mediate the conflict—an absence that is the legacy of 21 years of dictatorship under Mohammed Siad Barre. After only nine years of post-colonial civilian rule, Siad Barre, the commander in chief of the armed forces, seized power in a coup in October 1969.<sup>1</sup> The constitution was suspended, the National Assembly dissolved, political parties disbanded, and professional associations prohibited. Leading civilian politicians were arrested, most of whom remained in

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<sup>1</sup>Somalia became an independent country in 1960 with the unification of the northern region, the former British Protectorate of Somaliland, and the south, previously an Italian colony and a UN Trust Territory between 1950 and 1960.

detention for years. Civic organizations not expressly sponsored by the state were banned.

The new regime announced radical plans to transform overnight an underdeveloped, conservative, Islamic country, inhabited primarily by nomads and semipastoralist nomads, into a modern socialist state through "scientific socialism." Banking and insurance institutions were nationalized, as well as most of the country's limited industry. Management of most of the economy was entrusted to government agencies.

Determined to create a political system without constitutional, legislative, or judicial restraints on the exercise of executive power, Siad Barre worked to cement his control of the country. A vigorous personality cult was encouraged. Public adulation was nurtured by constant references on the radio and in the press to the actions and words of the nation's "Father." Radio newscasts and Siad Barre's public appearances began with a song dedicated to "Our Father, the Father of Knowledge." A forceful and brilliant public speaker whose mastery of language and of Somalia's history and clan structure was unrivaled, Siad Barre quickly dominated the political landscape.

An array of legislative provisions made it a capital offense to be a member of an opposition group or any organization the government considered unacceptable, including trade unions outside the government-controlled federation. Siad Barre's political system, like all oppressive regimes, also relied on security agents and secret informants whose function was to police hearts and minds and stamp out attempts at peaceful dissent. The most feared agency of the security apparatus was the National Security Service (NSS), for years headed by Siad Barre's son-in-law. But there were others, including the ubiquitous Victory Pioneers, a uniformed paramilitary group consisting mainly of uneducated youth that has been compared to Haiti's Tontons Macoute.

What the regime could not achieve through terror, it attempted to accomplish through the control of information. The government nationalized printing presses and the media, which was subject to strict and pervasive censorship. Most foreign journalists were denied visas, and contact between Somalis and foreigners living in the country, especially Westerners, was discouraged.

In accordance with the need to create a "modern" country, the government declared war on what it called the "scourge" of tribalism. To discourage clan affiliations, private arrangements for social gatherings, such as engagement and wedding ceremonies and funerals, were forbidden in 1973. Gatherings like these had to be held instead at orientation centers, where courses in political indoctrination were compulsory.

During his two decades in power Siad Barre proceeded, with studied deliberation and thorough effect, to dismantle the institutions that allowed people to articulate their grievances and that provided a framework for the resolution of conflict. Powerless to bring about change peacefully, many people left the country or turned

to violence, setting the stage for the current turmoil.

## **A COLD WAR PAWN**

Immediately after he seized power, Siad Barre forged close links with the Soviet Union, which provided economic, technical, and military assistance. Even before Siad Barre came to power, many officers had been trained in the Soviet Union, but the military links became closer after 1969 with Siad Barre's commitment to "scientific socialism." East Germany also provided training for the police and security forces, and during the drought that ravaged the country in 1974 and 1975, Moscow provided generous humanitarian assistance.

The Soviet connection was short-lived. In 1974, Marxist guerrillas in neighboring Ethiopia overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie. The political turbulence in Ethiopia gave Somalia the opportunity to promote its long-standing claim to the Ogaden, a desert region of Ethiopia settled by Somali-speaking people. In July 1977 the Somali army invaded the Ogaden and quickly captured several major towns.

Ethiopia, which until the emperor's fall had been a close ally of the United States, appealed to Moscow for aid. The Soviet Union switched allegiances, extending substantial assistance to the Ethiopian army, including airlifts of military equipment and advisers. Cuban combat units were also sent. With this outside aid, the Ethiopians forced the Somali army to retreat in March 1978, an event that was to have far-reaching political, economic, and social ramifications in Somalia.

Having been dropped by Moscow, Somalia turned to the United States, which after 1978 became the most important source of economic and military aid. In exchange the United States took advantage of Somalia's strategic location to establish a base from which it could further its cold war strategy in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. During the next decade, American interests in Somalia included a naval and military facility at the port of Berbera that was used for surveillance of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

The United States also supplied Siad Barre with the weapons that are being used today in Mogadishu to shell residential areas. These include the M-198 155 mm. howitzer, which can fire an 18-pound (40-kilogram) shell up to 48 miles (30 kilometers). Many of the small armaments being used, including the 106 mm. M-40A1 recoilless gun, the 105 mm. M-56 field gun, and AK-47 assault rifles, were also supplied by the United States. Close consultations between the administration of United States President George Bush and Somalia's military leaders continued well into 1989 and were finally curbed mainly because of pressure from Congress.

## **THE GENESIS OF THE SOMALI OPPOSITION**

After Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden in 1978, hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian refugees poured into the country, most of them from the Ogaden clan (mem-



bers of which also live in Somalia) and Oromos. The government settled many of the refugees in the northern region. The Isaaks, the largest clan in that region, accused the Siad Barre government of favoring the refugees at the expense of the local population by providing them with jobs, access to land, and educational and business opportunities. There were also complaints that the government was encouraging the creation of militias among the refugees. Clan elders repeatedly met with and sent appeals to government officials, charging that the refugees were terrorizing Isaaks living in the region bordering the Ogaden. The government refused to intervene, which reinforced suspicions that it was using the refugees to undermine the Isaaks.

In 1981 a group of Isaak exiles formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) in London in response to growing human rights violations. The SNM then based itself in Ethiopia and employed hit-and-run tactics to keep the Somali army off balance. It stepped up its military operations after 1984, which led to bloody, indiscriminate army reprisals against Isaak civilians.

On May 27, 1988, the SNM attacked Burao and on May 31 its forces attacked the northern city of Hargeisa. Unable to defeat the small and poorly armed SNM guerrilla force in direct combat, government troops turned their firepower on the civilian population, whom they said welcomed and aided the invasion. Aerial bombardment and heavy artillery shelling of residential districts destroyed Hargeisa and killed tens of thousands of people in towns throughout the north.<sup>2</sup>

In 1989 guerrilla warfare spread to the central and southern parts of the country, when two new movements—the United Somali Congress, operating in the central region with the support of the Hawiye clan, and the Somali Patriotic Front (SPM), supported by Ogaden living in the south—declared war on the government. Anxious to subdue the countryside and make it inhospitable to the guerrillas, the government carried out particularly brutal attacks on the rural population, killing civilians, burning villages, slaughtering livestock, and destroying water reservoirs.

In May 1990, as the government began to crumble, a group of businessmen and intellectuals who became known as the Manifesto group published an anti-government declaration. In September, in an effort to precipitate Siad Barre's departure, the USC, the SPM, and the SNM decided to coordinate their military tactics to

overthrow Siad Barre and form a coalition government. There were no public statements about political programs, and it is unlikely that any were discussed. Siad Barre's repression had been generally directed at clans, making ideological differences a luxury no one could afford, and making identification with one's clan a question of survival, both for the individual and the group. In any case, the immediate task was to oust Siad Barre, after which there was an agreement to hold a national conference to hammer out common policies and create an equal distribution of power.

During the last three months of 1990, Mogadishu and the whole of southern Somalia became a war zone as the campaign to dislodge Siad Barre escalated dramatically. In December 1990 and January 1991, as USC and SPM forces closed in on Mogadishu, Siad Barre instigated fighting inside the city. The fiercest clashes occurred on December 30, with fighting between members of the Darod clan (many of them armed by Siad Barre) and the Hawiye clan. Thousands of civilians lost their lives, particularly those belonging to the Hawiye, the largest clan in Mogadishu. At the same time, Siad Barre opened negotiations with some members of the Manifesto group.

On January 19, 1991, USC forces under the command of General Aidid, a former soldier who led a USC faction that was based in Ethiopia, entered the city, forcing Siad Barre to flee in a tank to his home area of Gedo, on the border with Kenya. Three days later, without consulting the leaders of the other armed opposition groups, prominent members of the Manifesto group formed a government, with Ali Mahdi, a wealthy hotelier, as interim president. This move set the stage for the strife that has since devastated Mogadishu. Aidid, the SPM, and the SNM immediately rejected Ali Mahdi's appointment and refused to recognize his authority.

In subsequent months, there was a succession of abortive attempts to reconcile the different armed organizations, legitimize the government, and unite the USC, which was split into factions headed by Ali Mahdi and Aidid. At a USC congress in June and July, Aidid was elected chairman of the entire USC. In August, two conferences were organized in neighboring Djibouti, which representatives of most of the armed movements attended. In what have come to be known as the Djibouti Accords, the presidency was given to the USC, which Ali Mahdi interpreted as confirmation of his position. Aidid claimed that the USC should be allowed to nominate its own candidate—namely, himself. The different interpretations were resolved by an agreement in early August, which confirmed Ali Mahdi as president, on the condition that steps were taken to end armed conflict, work toward an establishment of basic civil infrastructure, and make sure that Ali Mahdi would adhere to USC policy for reconstituting a national army.

Fighting again broke out in September, but was contained after neutral clans came between the two USC

<sup>2</sup>In January 1990, Africa Watch estimated that between 50,000 and 60,000 civilians were killed in the north between May 1988 and January 1990. For details see Africa Watch, *A Government at War with its Own People: Testimonies about the Killings and the Conflict in the North* (New York, 1990). Even after the war began, shipments of United States military hardware continued to arrive in the country, including a June 1988 delivery of about \$1.4-million worth of automatic rifles and ammunition.

factions with their armed vehicles and troops. Disputes continued, with each side menacing the other militarily. On November 13, Ali Mahdi moved his forces close to Aidid's headquarters. Full-scale fighting erupted on November 17 when Aidid responded with a lightning military strike on Ali Mahdi's troops.

In the course of 1991, the conflict between Aidid and Ali Mahdi became in part a battle between two subclans. The fighting surprised Somalis, since there are no appreciable religious, cultural, or other differences between the two subclans. There is no history of interclan fighting within the Hawiye clan, nor is there any traditional enmity between Aidid's *Habr Gidir* subclan and Ali Mahdi's *Abgal* subclan. The current rivalry between the two results from the way in which first Siad Barre and then the two USC leaders have sought to manipulate clan loyalty in order to secure a political power base. This legacy of newly manufactured ethnic tension is one of the most damaging political developments in contemporary Somalia, once Africa's most homogenous nation.

As the conflict continues, subclan loyalty—even subclan survival—is increasingly at stake, with the fear that the future may bring murderous retaliation against the losers. The fight is also fueled by money. In a poor and aid-dependent country such as Somalia, control over the symbols of “legitimate” or “sovereign” government is more than a matter of status; it is a license to print money. The government not only literally manufactures bank notes, but also controls the exchange rate, receives foreign aid, and can run up debts on the national account—all of which can bring great personal fortunes to those in office. Ali Mahdi and his ministerial colleagues have lost most of their businesses and depend on holding office for future income. Similarly, General Aidid and his financial backers are banking on their share of the spoils if they should win.

## THE NORTHERN SECESSION

Mogadishu is not the only trouble spot in Somalia. With Siad Barre's defeat, the SNM became increasingly dissatisfied with its alliance with the USC and the SPM. The lack of consultation by the USC and the SPM, and the failure to hold the long-promised national conference after the government's collapse, galvanized pro-secession sentiment among the northern region's Isaak clan, which is the SNM's support base. Isaak discontent fed on many grievances—the ferocity of the 1988 war and bitterness that none of the other main clans had condemned its savagery and had actually fought for the

government and profited from the plunder of Hargeisa. There was also a deep-seated feeling that the north had been deliberately starved of development resources and that the introduction of Somali as the official language was partly—if not entirely—motivated by the determination to blunt the educational advantages enjoyed by the north as an English-speaking region.

Despite widespread support for secession among the rank and file, the SNM leadership was against it, since it was aware that winning international recognition would be difficult. Ali Mahdi's decision to take power strengthened the hand of the pro-secessionists who forced the decision on the leadership by arguing that a government dominated by southern groups would deny it a voice in a united Somalia. The Republic of Somaliland was declared on May 18, 1991.

The security situation in the north is rapidly deteriorating, compounded by dire economic problems and the many Isaaks who are fleeing the war in Mogadishu. The predictable reluctance of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN), or any government to extend recognition means that little development assistance has been forthcoming. A few humanitarian groups with limited resources work with indigenous organizations struggling to rehabilitate a region devastated by warfare and land mines.<sup>3</sup> Hargeisa, to which most refugees from Mogadishu have returned, lies in ruins, with almost all its buildings destroyed. While there is no ideologically based opposition to the administration in Somaliland, its domination by the Isaak-supported SNM has led to resistance from some members of non-Isaak clans.

## THE UN AND SOMALIA

The tragedy in Somalia has been an international embarrassment for the UN. Citing security concerns, the UN and its specialized agencies withdrew their personnel from Mogadishu immediately after Siad Barre fell, even though the killing of civilians had already begun. It provided no assistance in 1991 and made no effort to become engaged when Mogadishu became a killing field in November. The burden of caring for civilians has been left primarily to the Red Cross and a few other humanitarian agencies, including the United States International Medical Corps, France's Doctors without Borders, and Britain's Save the Children Fund. In mid-December 1991, stung by unusually harsh public criticism from the Red Cross and the United States State Department's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the UN sent Under Secretary General James Jonah to Somalia. The visit, which was poorly planned and turned into a fiasco, revealed the depth of the UN's ignorance of the situation in Somalia.

Anxious for success, in mid-February of this year the UN called negotiators for Ali Mahdi and Aidid to New York and declared, after only two days of talks, that a cease-fire had been concluded. The fighting in Moga-

<sup>3</sup>There are still as many as 400,000 mainly Isaak refugees living in eastern Ethiopia, whom the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is eager to repatriate. However, both the administration in Somaliland and international relief agencies worry that many will be killed by land mines and that their sudden arrival would put a further burden on resources.

dishu, however, continued unabated. In late February, representatives of the UN, the OAU, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference visited Mogadishu to work out the details of the cease-fire.

UN insistence that the warring factions respect the cease-fire agreement before it provides food, medicine, and other necessities is misplaced. The war in Mogadishu is fueled by hunger, and carefully planned deliveries of humanitarian assistance regardless of a cease-fire will make a political agreement easier.

The latest UN Security Council resolution on Somalia, adopted on March 17, sparked an angry exchange between African countries and the United States. Afraid that Congress would refuse to provide additional aid to another country because it was concerned about the high cost of UN peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia, El Salvador, Yugoslavia, and the Western Sahara, the United States succeeded in downplaying the political significance of UN involvement in Somalia. At United States insistence, the final resolution limited the UN role in Somalia to the delivery of humanitarian aid. The United States also took the lead in toning down an earlier Security Council resolution on Somalia, adopted on January 23, to ensure that it would not engage the UN in attempting to resolve the underlying political conflict there.

The United States, which no longer needs Somalia as a cold war pawn, is now eager to avoid the larger costs associated in the short term with a UN role in curbing the slaughter. After spending millions of dollars to keep Siad Barre afloat, and giving him the military hardware to sustain the conflicts that have ravaged Somalia, the United States is now withholding the money that might bring a respite for the Somali people.

## RESOLVING THE CONFLICT

The current dispute within the USC is extraordinarily complex. The UN and other intermediaries must therefore take the time to learn the details of the situation. There are several potential flash points in the search for solutions.

The Ali Mahdi camp insists on UN peacekeeping forces, assuming that international involvement implies recognition of its claim to be the legitimate government of Somalia. This is reinforced by the varying degrees of support the OAU, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference have given to the Djibouti Accords of last July. Aidid fears international resolution of the conflict precisely because he suspects that the UN implicitly supports the accords and is prepared to recognize the existing government after the current fighting stops. Aidid is therefore adamant that a national reconciliation conference be held. Having repudiated the second accord signed at the Djibouti conference, he is confident that such a conference would replace the Ali Mahdi government with one in which his faction would play a greater role.

Another sensitive issue is responsibility for monitoring the cease-fire. Aidid's group favors the use of "neu-

tral" monitors from the Hawiye clan; the Ali Mahdi faction, suspecting the neutrals of a pro-Aidid bias, prefers an international presence, again hoping that this will endorse the legitimacy of the interim government.

The neutrality of the "neutral clans," such as the Hawadle and the Sheikhal, is largely a "negative neutrality"; for the most part they do not want to become involved in the conflict. There is, however, an opportunity to transform this into the "positive neutrality" observed during the fighting last September, when the then-neutral clans intervened to stop the fighting. International endorsement of their neutral position and political pressure, particularly from the UN, would strengthen their hand and encourage them to play a more active role to ensure careful monitoring of the cease-fire. (A major drawback of the February talks in New York was the failure to invite members of neutral clans.)

One of the most effective ways to keep a cease-fire in place and prevent an escalation of the war is to register and monitor heavy weapons and "technicals"—pick-up trucks with antitank guns or large caliber weapons such as machine guns. This should be done before attempting to disarm the two factions.

The country's best hope for relieving its agony is to return to its past and rely on the collective experience of its elders. Elders are regarded as the only social group in Somalia with the authority to promote the search for peaceful dialogue. This is a sobering measure of Somalia's desperation. Siad Barre had sought to undermine traditional communal authority through a policy of co-opting elders. Those he could not co-opt were killed, imprisoned, or forced into exile. Fortunately, some have survived and the community's respect for them remains intact. Although relief agencies have left the distribution of aid to the elders and have drawn the elders into discussions about the country's security, they cannot bear primary responsibility for brokering a peace accord. The intensity of the fighting alone makes it impossible for them to meet in peace and to forge common positions that will enable them to bring the warring factions to the negotiating table.

While the United States has been generous in its humanitarian assistance, the reality is that unless the conflict is resolved, humanitarian assistance to Somalia has only limited value. The prospects for peace are diminished by the absence of civilian institutions that might have fostered an atmosphere conducive to political discourse. This imposes a special responsibility on those who have the potential to play a constructive role—the OAU, the Islamic Conference, the Arab League, neighboring countries, and above all, the UN. Only constant international pressure will encourage the two warring factions to move toward a formula for ending the war, which has already claimed so many lives, and which has imperiled the entire population. If this can be accomplished, it could serve as a model for the numerous other conflicts in the country that have made Somalia such a stark international symbol of human misery. ■



# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

MARCH 1992

## INTERNATIONAL

### Arab League

(See *Intl, UN*)

### Arms Proliferation

March 9—A North Korean cargo ship suspected of carrying Scud-C ballistic missiles for delivery to Syria eludes a US Navy task force and docks in Bandar Abbas, Iran; the US had threatened to board and search the vessel.

March 17—A 2d North Korean ship thought to be carrying Scud missiles or their components for Syria arrives at Char Bahar, Iran.

### Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

(See *Intl, UN*)

### European Community (EC)

(See also *Yugoslavia*)

March 18—Finland applies for membership in the EC.

### International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

March 25—Under the terms of last year's Persian Gulf war cease-fire, the IAEA orders Iraq to destroy about a dozen buildings at the Al Atheer complex near Baghdad, the center of the country's secret program for atomic weapons research.

### International Court of Justice (World Court)

March 3—Libya opens proceedings against the US and Britain for failing to share evidence for a trial in Libya of 2 Libyans accused of the 1988 bombing of an American jetliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, that killed 270 people; in January, US and British authorities requested the extradition of the 2 men, who they say are Libyan government agents.

### International Monetary Fund (IMF)

(See also *Poland*)

March 31—The IMF endorses Russia's economic reform plan, which sets the stage for full membership in the organization and possible loans over the next year of up to \$4 billion.

### International Terrorism

March 7—Ehud Sadan, the highest-ranking Israeli embassy security officer in Turkey, is killed by a car bomb in Ankara; representatives of the Islamic Revenge Organization and Lebanon-based Islamic Holy War claim responsibility for the bombing.

March 17—A suicide car bomb destroys the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires; at least 30 people are reported killed and more than 100 are injured. Islamic Holy War takes responsibility for the bombing, which it says is in retaliation for Israel's killing of Sheik Abbas Musawi, the leader of the pro-Iranian Party of God (Hezbollah), in Lebanon last month.

March 26—A French judge orders Libya to extradite Samir Mohammed Ahmed Khaidir, a Palestinian official of Abu Nidal's Black September organization, which is based in Tripoli; Khaidir is charged with planning a 1988 attack on the cruise ship *City of Poros*, in which 3 French citizens were among the 9 people killed.

### Middle East Peace Conference

March 3—At continuing talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors in Washington, D.C., Israeli negotiators reject a Palestinian plan for self-rule in East Jerusalem and the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip that was developed from an outline proposed during the round of talks held in January.

March 4—The 4th round of talks ends.

### North Atlantic Cooperation Council

March 3—The Council, established last year as a forum where North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members could meet with representatives from eastern European countries and the former Soviet republics, meets in Brussels. Members agree on a German proposal urging international mediation and possible NATO military involvement in the predominantly Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.

### North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See also *Intl, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Open Skies Treaty*)

### Open Skies Treaty

March 24—In Vienna, all 16 NATO members and Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine sign the Open Skies Treaty, which allows limited overflights of their territory by foreign reconnaissance aircraft.

### Organization of African Unity (OAU)

(See *Intl, UN*)

### United Nations (UN)

(See also *Afghanistan; Cambodia; US, Foreign Policy; Yugoslavia*)

March 2—San Marino and 8 former Soviet republics—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—are admitted; this raises the number of UN members to 175.

March 3—In Mogadishu, Under Secretary General James Jonah, accompanied by officials of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Arab League, brokers a cease-fire accord in the civil war in Somalia; at least 14,000 people have been killed in fighting between interim President Mohammed Ali Mahdi's supporters and those of his opponent, General Mohammed Farrah Aidid; the 2 sides agreed at the UN to a previous cease-fire on February 14.

March 11—The head of the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi, tells Japanese Foreign Minister

Michio Watanabe that Japan is expected to contribute one-third, or nearly \$1 billion, of the cost of the mission and to send at least civilian personnel.

March 13—Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announces a peace mission to Armenia and Azerbaijan that will coordinate with a peace mission to be sent by the CSCE; the UN group will be led by former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

March 19—Iraq agrees to demolish equipment and facilities for producing and repairing ballistic missiles; the Security Council had ordered it to present a plan by March 29 for destroying production equipment and buildings for nuclear, ballistic, chemical, and biological weapons.

March 31—The Security Council approves a resolution that would ban air travel and arms sales to Libya by April 15 if Libya does not hand over 6 of its citizens wanted in connection with acts of terrorism; 10 Council members cast votes in favor of the resolution, while 5, including China, India, and Morocco, abstain.

## AFGHANISTAN

March 18—In his 1st public offer to leave office, President Najibullah announces that he will step down after an interim government is formed under a UN peace agreement negotiated last May; the agreement still must be approved by several Afghan factions, which have insisted that Najibullah must resign before the peace process can go forward.

## ALBANIA

March 23—Results of parliamentary elections held yesterday show that the opposition Democratic party won about 65% of the vote, or 81 of the 100 parliamentary seats up for election; the former Communist party, now renamed the Socialist party, won 26%, or 5 seats; smaller parties won the remainder of the seats.

## ALGERIA

March 4—An administrative court bans the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front (FIS); the FIS had won the largest number of votes in the 1st round of Algeria's free parliamentary elections in January.

March 29—The government announces that it will dissolve 400 local assemblies controlled by the FIS.

## ARGENTINA

(See *Intl, International Terrorism*)

## BELGIUM

March 7—After nearly 4 months of negotiations, a new center-left coalition government takes power with Jean-Luc Duhaene, a Christian Democrat, as prime minister.

## BULGARIA

(See *Intl, Open Skies Treaty*)

## CAMBODIA

March 13—UN observers report that at least 10 Cambodian soldiers have been killed and 40 injured in an offensive by Communist Khmer Rouge guerrillas; the offensive violates a cease-fire agreement signed last October by the government and the 3 opposing factions, including the Khmer Rouge.

March 30—The UN begins its program to repatriate nearly 370,000 Cambodian refugees from camps in Thailand.

## CHINA

(See also *Intl, UN; US, Foreign Policy, Legislation*)

March 12—Reporting on Communist party Politburo meetings on March 9 and 10, the party newspaper *People's Daily* says the party has called for a century of market-oriented economic reform, opening up to the outside world, and a rejection of ultra-leftism.

March 20—Speaking at the opening session of the annual National People's Congress, Prime Minister Li Peng says China should "take a bolder approach to reform" and restructure the economy to spur economic growth.

## COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

(See also *Intl, IMF, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Open Skies Treaty, UN; US, Foreign Policy*)

March 2—The Itar-Tass news agency reports that the last regiment of troops from the former Soviet army has begun to withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan where fighting has recently flared up between Armenian and Azeri forces.

Azeri news sources report new Armenian missile attacks on the Azeri towns of Shusha and Venjali; Azeri officials claim that in last week's Armenian attack on Khojaly as many as 1,000 people, not 100 as originally reported, were killed.

March 3—Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh block the final withdrawal of former Soviet troops; the army's removal would eliminate the remaining buffer between Armenian and Azeri forces in the enclave.

March 6—Ayaz Mutaibov, the president of Azerbaijan, resigns after demonstrations demanding action against Armenian separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh.

March 8—For a 3d day, Armenian and Azeri forces fight for control of the town of Askeran in Nagorno-Karabakh; several dozen people are reported killed.

March 12—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk announces at a news conference in Kiev that he is suspending the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia because there is no guarantee they will be destroyed; Ukraine has already transferred more than half its tactical arms to Russia for destruction.

March 14—*Pravda*, the Soviet Communist party's official newspaper, suspends publication for lack of funds.

March 15—In Teheran, Azeri and Armenian negotiators agree to a cease-fire; Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati mediated the negotiations.

March 16—Russian President Boris Yeltsin decrees the establishment of a Russian Defense Ministry, separate from that of the CIS, and names himself acting head of the ministry; Russia's deputy prime minister, Sergei Shakhrai, says the ministry will create a Russian army that is part of the CIS armed forces and is "subject to its operational command."

March 17—Meeting outside Moscow, 217 of the 2,250 former deputies of the disbanded Congress of People's Deputies try to reactivate the body; the Russian parliament declared the congress unconstitutional earlier in the day.

About 10,000 pro-Communist demonstrators gather outside the Kremlin in Moscow, where they call on Albert Makashov, a Soviet army general, to become president of a revived Soviet Union.

- March 18—Armenia declares a state of emergency because of an Azeri rail blockade of fuel and other goods.
- March 19—Fighting continues in Nagorno-Karabakh; a new cease-fire agreement is announced today in Yerevan, Armenia, by UN envoy Cyrus Vance.
- March 20—Moldovan President Mircea Snegur orders the takeover of former Soviet army property in the republic as a first step in the creation of a Moldovan army.
- March 22—Results of a referendum held yesterday in Tatarstan, a subdivision of Russia, show that 61% of voters favor "sovereignty"; it is unclear from the referendum's wording whether this is a call for the establishment of a separate Tatar republic or for local autonomy within Russia.
- March 24—A nuclear reactor at the Sosnovy Bor power plant outside St. Petersburg releases radioactive gases into the atmosphere; Russian officials say the levels of radiation released from the reactor, which is similar in design to the one in Chernobyl, are relatively low and pose no danger to the public.
- March 27—Armenian and Azeri negotiators agree to a formal 2-week extension of the cease-fire officially in place since March 15.
- March 28—Moldovan President Snegur orders the imposition of emergency rule in order to suppress increasing violence in Trans-Dniester, a region in eastern Moldova bordering Ukraine. In the last month about 40 people have been killed in fighting between ethnic Romanians, who comprise the majority of Moldovans, and separatist Slavs, who fear eventual Moldovan unification with Romania.
- March 31—In Moscow, 18 of the 20 main subdivisions of Russia sign a federation treaty defining the relationship between the central government and local authorities; the treaty also grants more economic and political autonomy to the subdivisions and establishes a single federal state. Chechen-Ingushetia, which declared its independence last November, and Tatarstan do not sign the treaty.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(See *Intl, Open Skies Treaty*)

## FINLAND

(See *Intl, EC*)

## FRANCE

(See also *Intl, International Terrorism; Spain*)

- March 22—Results of elections for regional councils show that the ruling Socialist party won only 19% of the vote, its lowest percentage in 23 years; the 2 main conservative parties won a total of 34% combined, the far-right National Front won 14%, and environmental parties 14.5%.

## GEORGIA

(See also *US, Foreign Policy*)

- March 10—Georgian radio reports that the ruling Military Council has selected former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to become chairman of a new State Council that will act as the country's executive and legislative authority.

## GERMANY

- March 31—Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg resigns over allegations that he was responsible for shipments of arms

to Turkey that have been used in recent Turkish attacks on Kurdish Workers party positions in Turkey; the German parliament halted all arms sales to Turkey in November because it believed Turkey had violated the Kurds' human rights.

## HAITI

- March 18—The House of Deputies meets to consider an internationally brokered agreement to reinstall Jean-Bertrand Aristide as president, but disputes among legislators force the session to end before a vote on ratification can be taken.

## HUNGARY

(See *Intl, Open Skies Treaty*)

## INDIA

(See also *Intl, UN*)

- March 14—Sikh separatist militants kill 20 people and injure 12 in Punjab state; most of the victims were Hindus.

## IRAN

(See *Intl, Arms Proliferation; CIS*)

## IRAQ

(See also *Intl, IAEA, UN*)

- March 2—Reuters reports that for a 2d day Turkish warplanes have attacked the bases of rebel Turkish Kurds in the area of Hakurk in northern Iraq.

Kurds in Kahak, one of 9 villages attacked, say the Turkish warplanes killed 10 people, all of them civilians.

- March 31—*The New York Times* reports that Iraqi forces have been shelling and firing on Kurdish rebels in towns along the Great Zab River in northern Iraq in an apparent violation of the cease-fire agreement that ended the Persian Gulf war in February 1991; 40,000 Kurds who live in the area have fled over the last week.

## ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, International Terrorism, Middle East Peace Conference; Lebanon; Spain; US, Foreign Policy*)

- March 1—Three Palestinians are killed in 2 days of clashes between Palestinians and Israeli troops in the occupied Gaza Strip.
- March 17—In Tel Aviv, a Palestinian member of the fundamentalist Islamic Resistance Movement kills 2 people and injures 19 before he is killed by a police officer.
- March 18—The Knesset votes, 55 to 32, in favor of a law that allows for direct election of the prime minister, beginning in 1996.
- March 27—Israel opens direct dialing telephone service to 10 Arab countries as a goodwill gesture. Jordan says it will block the incoming calls.

## JAMAICA

- March 15—Prime Minister Michael Manley announces that he will resign on March 28 because of poor health.
- March 28—The ruling People's National party meets and chooses Percival J. Patterson to succeed Manley as party leader; Patterson will thus become prime minister.

## JAPAN

(See also *Intl, UN*)



**JORDAN**(See *Israel*)**KENYA**

March 4—For a 3d day, several demonstrators in Nairobi are injured in a clash with police; the incident was touched off by police beatings of women conducting a hunger strike to demand the release of political prisoners.

March 20—President Daniel arap Moi bans all political meetings because of clashes in the last several weeks between two ethnic groups, the Kalenjin and the Luo, in which about 60 people have been killed; opposition leaders say the government allowed the violence to spread in order to undermine recent moves toward political liberalization.

**KOREA, NORTH**(See *Intl, Arms Proliferation*)**KOREA, SOUTH**

March 25—Results of parliamentary elections held yesterday show that the ruling Democratic Liberal party lost its majority when it won only 110 of the 237 seats up for election in the 299-seat National Assembly; the Democratic party won 74 seats, the recently formed Unification National party 31, and independents won 21.

March 26—Two independents agree to support the Democratic Liberal party, giving the ruling party a 1-vote majority in the National Assembly.

**LEBANON**

March 1—After a week-long lull, the pro-Iranian Party of God (Hezbollah) launches artillery attacks on Israeli troops in Israel's self-proclaimed security zone in southern Lebanon; 3 Israeli soldiers are killed.

March 9—Beirut police confirm the 1st official figures, published by the newspaper *An Nahar* last week, on casualties in the country's civil war; the statistics indicate that more than 144,000 people were killed and nearly 200,000 injured between 1975 and 1990 (excluding those killed and injured in conflicts involving Palestinians); the newspaper account said more than 17,000 people are still missing and presumed dead.

**LIBYA**(See *Intl, International Terrorism, UN, World Court; US, Foreign Policy*)**MOROCCO**(See *Intl, UN*)**MOZAMBIQUE**

March 21—The Mozambican National Union (Unamo), formerly a guerrilla group, announces that it has registered with the Justice Ministry as the 1st legal opposition political party.

**POLAND**(See also *Intl, Open Skies Treaty*)

March 5—The Sejm, the lower house of parliament, votes 171 to 138, with 38 abstentions, to reject a government economic plan to help ease the "shock treatment" of free-market reforms; IMF officials had warned that the plan, which

called for increased government spending and gradual expansion of the money supply, would spark inflation and retard the reforms.

**ROMANIA**(See *Intl, Open Skies Treaty; CIS*)**SAN MARINO**(See *Intl, UN*)**SAUDI ARABIA**

March 1—King Fahd issues several decrees aimed at liberalizing Saudi Arabia's political system, including announcement of a new constitution with a bill of rights. A long-promised 60-member Consultative Council will be created to confer with and advise the Cabinet and propose and review legislation. The king retains most major foreign and domestic policy authority.

March 29—In an interview published today in several Arab newspapers, King Fahd says Saudi Arabia will not conduct free elections because Western democratic practices are not suited to Arab societies of the Persian Gulf.

**SOMALIA**(See *Intl, UN*)**SOUTH AFRICA**

March 18—Results of a whites-only referendum held yesterday show that 68.7% of voters approve President F. W. de Klerk's efforts to end apartheid through negotiations; 88% of registered white voters participated. De Klerk says this "closes the book on apartheid," but right-wing Conservative party leader Andries Treurnicht says his supporters will continue to resist black-majority rule.

March 23—The government announces proposals for the appointment of multiracial "transitional councils" that would advise it on constitutional changes; the African National Congress, which favors an appointed interim government, criticizes the proposals, which it says allow the government to control the process of change.

March 26—Saying that no participant in a transitional government can maintain a private army, the government calls on the ANC to renounce armed struggle and disband its military wing, Spear of the Nation.

March 30—A working committee of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) sets June 30 as the target date for establishing an interim government; at the convention, the National party government proposes the election of a new, 2-chamber parliament to draft a nonracial constitution.

**SPAIN**

March 29—French officials report that they have arrested Francisco Múgica Garmendia, the military leader of the Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) guerrillas, and 11 others in the French Basque town of Bidart.

March 31—King Juan Carlos and Israeli President Chaim Herzog join in a ceremony at a Madrid synagogue commemorating the 500th anniversary of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain.

**SYRIA**(See *Intl, Arms Proliferation*)

## THAILAND

March 22—Results of parliamentary elections today show that Chart Thai, Samakkhi Tham, and Social Action, parties aligned with the ruling military junta, have won 53% of the vote, or 360 seats in the lower house; the Power of Virtue and 2 other pro-democracy parties won 42%, or 152 seats. The ruling junta names all 270 members of the upper house, more than half of them military or police officers.

March 25—Samakkhi Tham leader Narong Wongwan announces in Bangkok that he will lead a 5-party coalition government, but the ruling junta says the search for a prime minister is not yet over.

## TURKEY

(See also *Intl, International Terrorism; Germany; Iraq*)

March 1—A synagogue in Istanbul is attacked with grenades; no group takes responsibility.

March 21—Kurdish separatists clash with police and troops in Cizre, near Turkey's border with Syria and Iraq; at least 21 people are killed.

March 22—At least 20 people are killed in a 2d day of clashes between Kurds and Turkish forces.

## UNITED KINGDOM (UK)

### Great Britain

(See also *Intl, World Court*)

March 11—Prime Minister John Major asks Queen Elizabeth II to dissolve Parliament on March 16; he schedules national elections for April 9.

March 17—The parent company of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, HSBC Holdings P.L.C.—which is incorporated in Britain but headquartered in Hong Kong—announces that it plans to purchase Midland Bank P.L.C., Britain's 3d-largest bank; if headquarters are moved to Britain, the merged bank would be the largest in Britain.

## UNITED STATES (US)

### Administration

March 11—Andrew Card is sworn in as secretary of transportation, replacing Samuel Skinner, who became White House chief of staff in December.

March 20—Attorney General William Barr appoints a special council to review operations at the staff-run bank at the House of Representatives and members' overdrafts on their checking accounts there.

The Health and Human Services Department issues guidelines that it says allow doctors—but not other health-care professionals—in federally funded family planning clinics to provide limited abortion counseling.

### Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Arms Proliferation, World Court*)

March 5—The Department of Energy announces a one-year, \$90,000 contract with 116 scientists at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow for research on the tokamak ("doughnut") fusion reactor.

March 7—*The New York Times* reports on a leaked draft of a Defense Department policy statement that casts the US in the role of the world's sole superpower in the post-cold war world; the draft says the US should prevent the emergence of a competing power that might seek "to overturn the established political and economic order."

March 16—At the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney presents Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens with intelligence indicating that Israel shared US Patriot antimissile defense technology with China, in violation of an agreement with the US; Arens tells reporters afterward that the charges are baseless.

March 19—The State Department advises all US citizens to leave Libya immediately, before the UN debates whether to impose sanctions, including the severing of air links; a January UN Security Council resolution demanded that Libya cooperate in investigations of 2 airline bombings, including the 1988 downing of a Pan-American World Airways jet over Lockerbie, Scotland.

March 24—The US announces that it will establish diplomatic relations with Georgia. Georgia is the last of the former Soviet republics to be recognized formally by the US.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS March Reports

	Change from previous period	Total
<b>Gross Domestic Product (GDP)</b> 4th quarter 1991, revised	+0.4%	\$4.87 trillion (annual rate)
<b>Merchandise Trade Deficit</b> 1991	-32%	\$73.6 billion
January	-2.9%	\$5.77 billion
<b>Consumer Price Index</b> February	+0.3%	138.6 points
<b>Unemployment</b> February	+0.2%	7.3%
Highest since 1985		(9.2 million)
<b>Leading Economic Indicators</b> February	+0.8%	147.6 points

Sources: Commerce and Labor Department reports; news reports.

## Legislation

March 2—President George Bush vetoes a bill approved by the House on November 26 and the Senate on February 25 that would have placed conditions on the renewal of most favored nation (MFN) trade status for China; Bush says that weakening trade links would foster repression in China.

March 13—By a 50-47 vote, the Senate approves legislation that, among other measures, would increase the income tax rate from 31% to 36% for individuals earning more than \$150,000 and couples more than \$175,000 a year, and provide a \$300 tax credit for each child.

March 18—Voting 60 to 38, the Senate fails to override Bush's March 2 veto of the bill imposing restrictions on the renewal of MFN trade status for China; the House overrode the veto by a vote of 357 to 61 on March 11.

March 20—The House approves, in a 211-189 vote, a compro-

mise \$77.5-billion, 5-year tax package; the bill would raise the top tax rate from 31% to 36% for individuals with \$115,000 and couples with \$140,000 in yearly taxable income and institute a 10% surcharge on annual incomes of more than \$1 million. Bush announces that he has already prepared the veto message for the bill.

March 27—The Senate authorizes an additional \$25 billion in federal funds for the savings and loan industry bailout; the vote was 52 to 42.

By a 365-3 vote, the House passes a bill for higher education that would allow students from families with annual incomes of up to \$49,000 to receive grants formerly set aside mainly for the poor, and would exclude equity in a home, family business, or farm from calculations of need. The bill goes to a House-Senate conference.

March 31—In a 238-187 vote, the House rejects a budget plan that would have applied 70%, or more than \$6 billion, in military savings to social programs in fiscal year 1993; all such savings will now go toward reducing the deficit.

### Political Scandal

March 12—The House votes unanimously to disclose the names of 301 current and 54 former members who over-drew their checking accounts at the House bank from 1988 to July 1990; some members wrote hundreds of bad checks totaling tens of thousands of dollars.

### Politics

March 4—Results from balloting in yesterday's primaries and caucuses in 7 states and American Samoa show that among Democrats, former California Governor Edmund G. Brown won in Colorado, Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton won in Georgia, Iowa Senator Tom Harkin won in his home state and in Minnesota, and former Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas won in Maryland, Utah, and Washington.

In the Republican primaries and caucuses, President George Bush posted wins in Colorado, Georgia, and Maryland; his challenger, television commentator Patrick Buchanan, received between 30% and 36% of the vote.

March 5—Senator Bob Kerrey of Nebraska announces his withdrawal from the race for the Democratic party presidential nomination.

March 9—Results published today from contests held March 7 show that Clinton won the South Carolina Democratic primary and the Wyoming caucuses; Tsongas won the Arizona Democratic caucuses. Bush won the South Carolina Republican primary.

Harkin drops out of the race for the Democratic nomination.

March 10—*The New York Times* reports that Brown won the Nevada caucuses held March 8 and that his supporters in Maine say that results from final caucuses there have given him a win over Tsongas.

March 11—Results from yesterday's "Super Tuesday" primaries and caucuses, in which about 20% of the delegates to the Democratic nominating convention were at stake, show that Clinton won in 8 states and Tsongas in 3. Clinton gained 430 delegates, for a total of 728, about one-third the number needed for nomination. Bush won all 8 Republican primaries; he picked up 376 delegates, for a total of 582—more than half the number needed for nomination.

March 18—Results from primaries held yesterday show that

Clinton won in both Illinois and Michigan, with Tsongas the runner-up in the former state and Brown in the latter. Bush won the Republican primaries in Michigan and Illinois, and now has 729 delegates to Buchanan's 46.

March 19—Citing a lack of funds, Tsongas "suspend[s]" his campaign for the Democratic nomination.

March 25—Results from yesterday's Democratic primary in Connecticut show that Brown defeated Clinton by 1%. Bush wins the Republican primary.

March 31—Brown wins the Democratic caucuses in Vermont.

### Supreme Court

March 31—Overturning a more stringent ruling by a federal appeals court in Atlanta, the Court, in an 8-0 opinion, says that formerly segregated school districts may win gradual release from the supervision of federal courts as they achieve racial equality in various aspects of operations.

## YUGOSLAVIA

March 1—A majority of voters approve a referendum on independence in the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Serbian residents, who comprise 32% of the republic's population but control 60% of the territory, have threatened to secede if the referendum passed. In a separate referendum, a majority of voters in the republic of Montenegro support independence.

March 8—The commander of the UN peacekeeping force, Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, arrives in Belgrade to prepare for the deployment in Croatia and Slovenia of 14,400 UN troops from 31 countries.

March 11—In Belgrade about 5,000 demonstrators, mostly students, call on Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and his government to resign.

March 14—The first contingent of UN peacekeeping troops arrives in Sarajevo to set up headquarters for operations in Croatia and Slovenia.

March 18—In Belgrade, Muslim Slav, Croatian, and Serbian leaders agree to an EC plan for an independent republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; the new country would be divided into three ethnic regions, and defense, economic, and foreign policy would be decided on jointly by the 3 regional governments.


March 27—After 2 days of fighting in the town of Bosanski Brod, leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina ask the UN to deploy peacekeeping troops in the republic. Fighting between Serbs and joint Muslim Slav and Croat forces near the border with Croatia has left about 30 dead. Although the UN troops are headquartered in Sarajevo, the UN plan does not call for them to be deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

## ZIMBABWE

March 19—Parliament approves legislation authorizing the government to seize land owned by white farmers but offering little compensation and no right of appeal; 1 million black landless peasants are expected to be resettled on the seized land. ■

*Erratum:* Due to an editorial error, a reference to President George Bush's legislative record during his congressional career on page 152 of the April issue incorrectly states that he voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Act and refers to him as a senator; the president actually served two terms in the House of Representatives, beginning in 1967.





## COMING IN SEPTEMBER IN CURRENT HISTORY: CHINA

The September issue concentrates on China in the new global environment, with analyses of relations with the United States and the former Soviet Union, as well as of China's role as a regional power in Asia. Other articles will focus on Chinese domestic affairs, including economic changes and the "third tier" of Chinese leadership. The issue also examines internal and external developments in post-Communist Mongolia. *Topics scheduled to be covered include:*

- **United States Policy in China**  
BY STEVEN LEVINE, BOULDER RUN RESEARCH,  
AND ANDREW NATHAN, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
- **China as a Regional Power**  
BY SAMUEL KIM, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
- **The Younger Generation of Chinese Political Leaders**  
BY RICHARD BAUM, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA  
AT LOS ANGELES
- **Changes in Rural China**  
BY TYRENE WHITE, SWARTHMORE COLLEGE
- **China's Economy**  
BY TOM GOTTSCHANG, COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS
- **Mongolia**  
BY MORRIS ROSSABI, QUEENS COLLEGE
- **China's Special Economic Zones:  
Harbingers of Democracy?**  
BY JAN PRYBYLA, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
- **China and the Former Soviet Union**  
BY HUAN GUOCANG, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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